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and The Gordon Law Firm, P.C.

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,)	Case No.: CV12-6147-RSWL(MRWx)
)	Complaint Filed: 7/18/2012
Plaintiff,)	
)	DEFENDANT CHANCE E. GORDON
vs.)	AND GORDON LAW FIRM, P.C.'S
)	OPPOSITION TO RECEIVER'S
Chance Edward Gordon, etc., et al.,)	REQUEST FOR PAYMENT; REQUEST
)	TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants.)	
_____)	Date: March 4, 2013
)	Time: 1:30 p.m.
)	Ct.Room: Hon.Percy Anderson
)	15

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I. Introduction

Recent decisional authority has raised a substantial question about the validity of the instant prosecution and all related enforcement activities, including without limitation the appointment of the Receiver, and his lawyers, in this action. The recent decision in *Canning v. N.L.R.B.*, 2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. 2013) strikes like a dagger into the heart of the instant action and gives reason to question its validity *ab initio*.

Most of the balance of the Gordon Defendants’ opposition is the same as their earlier opposition. The Receiver’s pending motion seeks payment of nearly money collected from the Gordon and Pessar business entities, including money extracted from bank accounts of Gordon & Associates Publishing, Inc., an entity that is not even a defendant in this action. The Pessar Defendants have settled with a proposed stipulated judgment that abandons their money collected by the Receiver. The Gordon Defendants take no position regarding that money.

The Gordon Defendants suggest that their money approximately \$60,600, plus an amount reserved as interest, must be held pending the outcome of this action. It would be a travesty to distribute money to the Receiver and then conclude that the entire prosecution was void *ab initio* because of the unconstitutional acts of an overzealous President.

The Receiver’s pending motion demonstrates Plaintiff’s bad faith in initiating this action because, if the motion is granted, there will be nearly no money to distribute to injured consumers. While the number of pre-litigation injured consumers was minimal, e.g., the Gordon Defendants had a success rate between 85% and 95% based on a fair reading of the Receiver’s first report, the Receiver’s conduct has virtually guaranteed that there will be many. At the Receiver’s fee application demonstrates, the Receiver spent nearly nothing on running the existing businesses preferring, instead, to justify its

1 reputation as a liquidation only firm. Thus, over 800 active clients in financial distress,
2 many of whom were facing foreclosure, were totally abandoned by the receiver. Despite
3 the absence of proof of a substantial amount of consumers injured before the instant
4 action was filed, there will certainly be a significant number of consumers injured after
5 the Receiver seized and dismantled the defendant businesses.

6 The Receiver's pending motion seeks nearly all of the collected money. While it
7 would be tedious and pointless to attempt to attack the billing line item by line item, it is
8 clear that most of the billing is unnecessary because the Receiver failed to operate the
9 modification business. Instead, the Receiver acted as an investigative agent of the
10 Plaintiff and should be paid from governmental funds and not the funds of the Gordon
11 Defendants who have not been found liable for any misconduct.

12 The Gordon Defendants object to the use of their money to make any interim
13 payment to the Receiver, his lawyers, and others employed by the Receiver. There has
14 been no adjudication that the money collected by the Receiver - particularly money
15 belonging to the Gordon Defendants and a third party - is the product of unlawful
16 conduct. There has not even been a preliminary determination - after the Gordon
17 Defendants were given an opportunity to present an opposition - that Plaintiff has a
18 likelihood of success on the merits. Moreover, a fair and objective analysis of the figures
19 presented in the Receiver's first report demonstrates that 85% to 95% of the consumers in
20 question received the services they contracted for. Plaintiff's only success has been by
21 presenting an ex-parte application, with a complaint under seal and no notice to the
22 Gordon Defendants, where Plaintiff puffed the significance of a vocal but statistically
23 insignificant minority of disgruntled former customers. Under these circumstances, there
24 is no justification to grant the instant motion.

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1 In the event the Court is inclined to make an interim award, the Gordon
2 Defendants object to the majority of the request for fees on the grounds that the work is
3 neither necessary nor appropriate. Much of the charges are for work that can only be
4 described as litigation support for Plaintiff. In essence, Plaintiff has hired an
5 investigative and research team and seeks to pass on the expenses to Defendants. That
6 ploy should be condemned, not rewarded.

7
8 **II. The Pending Motion Is Procedurally Defective**

9 Local Rule 7-3 contains a meet and confer process required before filing a motion.
10 That rule requires a notice of motion to specify “This motion is made following a
11 conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place on (date).” The Receiver has
12 failed to comply with that requirement. In addition, the instant motion, expressly made
13 pursuant to Local Rule 66-7, is premature. The local rule applies to permanent receivers,
14 not temporary receivers. Accordingly, the instant motion should be denied without
15 prejudice based on procedural blunders.

16
17 **III. There Is Valid Reason To Conclude That The Instant Action Is**
18 **Constitutionally Invalid, So Approving The Expenditure Of The Gordon**
19 **Defendants’ Money Should Await Resolution Of The Constitutional Issue**

20 Plaintiff was established as the result of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
21 provided plenary powers, many of which were transferred from other agencies. These
22 powers, and direction for the fledgling agency were outlined in a July 15, 2011 report of
23 the Office of Inspector General, which was entitled “Review of CFPB Implementation
24 Planning Activities” (hereinafter “OIG Report”). The Gordon Defendants ask this Court
25 to take Judicial notice of the OIG Report.
26

1 Page 2 of the OIG report explains that “As mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, a
2 presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed director is to lead the agency. A CFPB
3 Director has not yet been appointed.” Page 4 of the OIG Report contains the following
4 significant limitations on the CFPB’s authority and powers:

5 In addition to the transferred functions, CFPB has newly-established federal
6 consumer financial regulatory authorities. The Treasury Secretary is not
7 permitted to perform certain newly-established CFPB authorities if there is
8 no Director by the designated transfer date. For example, if there is no
9 Director by the designated transfer date, in general, the Treasury Secretary
10 is not permitted to exercise the authority to:

- 11 • prohibit unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices under subtitle C in
12 connection with consumer financial products and services;
- 13 • prescribe rules and require model disclosure forms under subtitle C to
14 ensure that the features of a consumer financial product or service are
15 fairly, accurately, and effectively disclosed both initially and over the
16 term of the product or service;
- 17 • prescribe rules under section 1022 relating to, among other things, the
18 filing of limited reports to CFPB for the purpose of determining whether
19 a nondepository institution should be supervised by CFPB;
- 20 • supervise nondepository institutions under section 1024, including the
21 authority to (a) prescribe rules defining the scope of nondepository
22 institutions subject to CFPB’s supervision, (b) prescribe rules
23 establishing recordkeeping requirements that CFPB determines are
24 needed to facilitate nondepository supervision, and (c) conduct
25 examinations of nondepository institutions.

21 In summary, the CFPB did not gain authority to bring enforcement actions against
22 non banking persons (natural or legal) until “a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed
23 director is to lead the agency.”

24 It is well known that the CFPB’s director, Richard Cordray, was appointed by
25 President Obama on January 4, 2012 and was not confirmed by the United States Senate.
26

1 See New York Times Article, January 4, 2012. The Gordon Defendants ask this Court to
2 take Judicial notice of the New York Times Article.

3 The significance of this unconfirmed appointment was the subject of review in
4 *Canning v. N.L.R.B.*, 2013 WL 276024 (D.C. Cir. 2013), which tested the constitutional
5 validity of “three members [of the NLRB who] were all appointed by the President on
6 January 4, 2012, purportedly pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause of the
7 Constitution, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.” According to the *Canning* Court, the
8 presidential appoints on that day were not valid “intrasession recess” appointments for a
9 variety of well explained reasons. As a result, the NLRB’s order was vacated, and the
10 Court of Appeals refused to enforce an invalid order.

11 The CFPB’s director, Richard Cordray, was appointed on the same day, using the
12 same invalid usurpation of legislative authority. Thus, according to the reasoning of the
13 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, enforcement actions initiated during the Cordray reign,
14 including the instant action, would be constitutionally infirm. The instant situation is
15 even more infirm than the NLRB situation because the OIG Report specifically requires
16 the CFPB to have “a presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed director is to lead the
17 agency.” There has been no Senate confirmation of the CFBP’s director.

18 Distribution of the Gordon Defendants’ money should await the determination of
19 the validity of this action. The Gordon Defendants have propounded Requests for
20 Admissions regarding the date and nature of Mr. Cordray’s appointment. Responses are
21 likely to be followed by a summary judgment motion based on the *Canning* holding.
22 Should this Court follow the well reasoned opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
23 then it is likely that the Court would to find that Plaintiff lacked the authority to file the
24 instant action, so it should be dismissed. With that disposition not only possible but
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1 likely given the current state of the law, then the Gordon Defendants should not be forced
2 to chase after wrongfully seized funds.

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4 **IV. The Issue Of Payment For The Receiver Should Be Deferred**

5 As previously argued, the issue is not whether the Receiver should be paid for its
6 work but, rather, who should pay the Receiver. The current motion seeks to use collected
7 funds (namely, the money that would otherwise belong to the Defendants or would be
8 refunded to consumers whose work was not completed because this litigation obstructed
9 Defendants' ability to finish pro bono loan modification work). Once dissipated, those
10 funds would not be available to return to Defendants, should Defendants prevail on the
11 merits, or to compensate consumers who suffered because the Receiver did no loan
12 modification work. Accordingly, the issue of whether the Receiver should be paid from
13 collected funds or from the Plaintiff's budget should wait.

14
15 **V. The Gordon Defendants Should Not Have To Pay For Investigative Efforts**

16 Plaintiff has cleverly crafted the receivership order to assign to the Receiver the
17 task of investigating issues that Plaintiff would have to prove at trial. The Receiver's
18 clearly biased conduct, from the exclusion of the Gordon Defendants from their office, to
19 the refusal to make payments to preserve frozen assets, to the unquestionably biased
20 reports and statements to this Court, demonstrate Plaintiff is getting what it bargained for.

21 A review of the moving papers demonstrates that most of the work performed is
22 for the benefit of Plaintiff's litigation efforts and not for the benefit of any consumer, as
23 described below:

- 24 • The Receiver seeks recovery for a preliminary analysis of the sales and marketing
25 activities, business operations, and activities of the Receivership Defendants. This
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1 must be reviewed in light of the Receiver's history as a liquidation firm (*see*
2 Plaintiff's submission of Robb Evans & Associates' firm resume and history
3 attached to their first opposition), the Receiver's failure to do anything to try to
4 operate the processing department, and the Receiver's desire to liquidate
5 Defendants' business. The liquidation option was a foregone conclusion, despite
6 the Receiver's anticipated protests to the contrary, so this work had no value other
7 than to provide Plaintiff with evidence for trial.

- 8 • The Receiver seeks recovery for an analysis of case files. Again, this served no
9 consumer benefit, as the Receiver did nothing to attempt to work or process the
10 files. The same blanket suggestion that consumers seek alternative arrangements
11 and liquidation recommendation could have been accomplished without this work.
12 Again, the most of the Receiver's work amounted to thinly veiled litigation
13 support for Plaintiff, which should be paid for by Plaintiff not the Gordon
14 Defendants.
- 15 • The Receiver seeks recovery for efforts to evaluate closing numbers. That is pure
16 investigation for Plaintiff and has nothing to do with a legitimate receivership
17 function.
- 18 • The Receiver seeks recovery for describes analysis of complaints. Again, that is
19 pure investigation for Plaintiff and has nothing to do with a legitimate receivership
20 function. That is substantiated by the statements in the end of the paragraph,
21 where Mr. Kane tacitly admits that the purpose of that work was to file a second
22 report because the results of the first one were too favorable to the Gordon
23 Defendants. Apparently, Plaintiff was embarrassed about the transparency of the
24 bias in the Receiver's initial report and the ease with which the Receiver's
25 numbers were properly reclassified to show a laudable success rate. Frantic to
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1 justify its existence and please Plaintiff, the Receiver worked aggressively to
2 create some basis to support its efforts to revise “downward its conclusions
3 regarding the likely success rate.”

- 4 • The Receiver seeks recovery for a variety of litigation support efforts, not
5 legitimate receivership efforts with one exception. The detailed analysis of
6 customer records, quickbooks records, and other business operations data is totally
7 unnecessary given the fact that the Receiver was never going to operate the
8 processing business. It only provides investigation for Plaintiff for trial.
- 9 • The Gordon Defendants conceded that a receptionist - with scripts to respond to
10 questions - was necessary to address consumer calls and concerns. The Gordon
11 Defendants will conceded that developing the scripts would cost approximately
12 \$1,000 of associate lawyer time, as well as a \$10 per hour receptionist for 40 hours
13 per week for 7 weeks (\$2,800).

14 The Receiver’s moving declarations chronicle work that is clearly improper to
15 charge to the receivership estate. This includes reviewing facebook postings, which has
16 no value to any consumer and should be done, if at all, outside of billable time. This also
17 includes opposing Mr. Gordon’s request for subsistence money. This is particularly
18 disingenuous. The receiver and its lawyer want a substantial amount of money to object
19 to Mr. Gordon’s request for money to maintain and feed himself and pay his counsel, so
20 that it would have been more cost effective to allow Mr. Gordon to have some of his
21 money for his expenses. Mr. Gordon is forced to feed himself by hunting game because
22 his request for substance money was effectively denied, while the Receiver wants to be
23 paid from Mr. Gordon’s earnings for participating in the effort to starve him. That is a
24 particularly despicable misallocation of resources.

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VI. Conclusion

The initiation and prosecution of this action, particularly given the high profile and public nature of the CFPB’s enforcement actions, has causes irreparable injury to the Gordon Defendants. Their legal publishing business and law practice have been destroyed and liquidated, with no meaningful prospect of resurrection even if they are vindicated on all counts, and even, in the more likely case, this action terminates because Mr. Cordray’s appointment was unconstitutional. At very minimum, the money seized from the Gordon Defendants, and some cushion for interest, should be retained to provide some capital for Mr. Gordon to start over.

Respectfully presented,

LAW OFFICE OF GARY KURTZ
A Professional Law Corporation

Dated: February 11, 2013

By: *Gary Kurtz*
Gary Kurtz, Esq. Attorney for
Defendants Chance E. Gordon
and The Gordon Law Firm, P.C.

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REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

Pursuant to Rule 201, Federal Rules of Evidence, Defendants Chance E. Gordon and The Gordon Law Firm, P.C., request that this Court take Judicial Notice of the following two documents:

1. July 15, 2011 report of the Office of Inspector General, which was entitled “Review of CFPB Implementation Planning Activities.” A true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit “1;”
2. New York Times Article, January 4, 2012. A true and correct copy is attached hereto as Exhibit “2;” and
3. The CFPB’s director is Richard Cordray, who was appointed by President Obama on January 4, 2012.

Respectfully presented,

LAW OFFICE OF GARY KURTZ
A Professional Law Corporation

Dated: February 11, 2013

By: *Gary Kurtz*
Gary Kurtz, Esq. Attorney for
Defendants Chance E. Gordon
and The Gordon Law Firm, P.C.

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Certification

I hereby certify that, on February 11, 2013 a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT CHANCE E. GORDON AND GORDON LAW FIRM, P.C.'S OPPOSITION TO RECEIVER'S REQUEST FOR PAYMENT; REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE T was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the court's electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the court's EM/ECF System.

Dated: February 11, 2013

Gary Kurtz

Gary Kurtz