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MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, YELLOWSTONE COUNTY

CHERYL BRATTON, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated Montanans,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

SISTERS OF CHARITY OF LEAVENWORTH HEALTH SYSTEM, INC. d/b/a SCL HEALTH,

Defendant.

Case No.: DV 18-1609

Judge Gregory R. Todd

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION/SUPPLEMNTAL MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

#### INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Sisters of Charity of
Leavenworth Health System Inc.'s (hereinafter "SCL Health") motion for summary
judgment that was filed on February 19, 2019. On April 11, 2019, Cheryl Bratton
(hereinafter "Bratton") responded to SCL Health's motion for judgment and filed a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to Count II (conversion). On April 15,
2019, Bratton filed an amended complaint. On April 25, 2019, SCL Health filed a
supplemental motion for summary judgment on Bratton's newly added claims. On April

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30, 2019, Bratton filed a response to SCL Health's supplemental motion for summary judgment and filed her brief in support of cross-motion for partial judgment as to Count IV (money had and received) and Count V (declaratory judgment). On May 8, 2019, SCL replied to Bratton's response in opposition to its motion for summary judgment, and to Bratton's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Count II (Conversion). On May 28, 2019, SCL Health replied to its supplemental motion for summary judgment on newly added claims and opposition to plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on counts IV (money had and received) and V (declaratory judgment). On May 30, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the pending summary judgment motions. The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

On October 19, 2018, Bratton initiated her suit against SCL Health because she took issue with the method by which SCL Health has provided refunds to her. Since January 2015, SCL Health has provided patient refunds by issuing prepaid Mastercard debit cards through Bank of America. SCL Health refers to this as the Patient Refund Card Program. When SCL Health determines a refund is necessary, it transmits the refund amount and name and contact information for the patient account at issue to Bank of America. Bank of America then removes the appropriate funds from SCL Health's depository account, creates and loads a prepaid debit card with the amount of the refund, and sends the Patient Refund Card to the patient or guarantor. Funds associated with the Patient Refund Card are then held in a separate account from SCL Health's depository account. The Patient Refund Card is attached to a Bank of America card carrier that bears SCL Health's logo. The patient is provided information on how to activate and use the card without assessing fees. The Patient Refund Card provides patients with a Bank of America customer service number to call if the patient has any

questions about the card. If the patient does not wish to receive a Patient Refund Card, a paper check can be issued free of charge to the cardholder upon request.

Bratton received services at a SCL Health facility in Montana in 2018. SCL Health billed the insurer on file for Bratton for the services she received. SCL Health billed Bratton for the remaining balance that was left on her account after her insurer provided payment. SCL Health received payment on Bratton's behalf from a secondary insurer after Bratton had made the remaining balance payment. The remaining balance was \$12.75. SCL Health authorized Bank of America to issue a Patient Refund Card to Bratton in the amount of \$12.75. Bratton's Patient Refund Card had an expiration date of July 2021, and Bratton had activated her card on August 21, 2018. In December of 2018, Bratton had been issued another Patient Refund Card in the amount of \$15.00. Bratton did not request a reissuance of refund in the form of a check for these Patient Refund Cards. The total amount refunded to Bratton through the two Patient Refund Cards provided by Bank of America was \$27.75.

Bratton argued that she never consented to allow SCL Health to give any refundable money to Bank of America. Bratton argued that she never consented to SCL Health sharing her private information with Bank of America. Bratton argued that the refund program SCL Health uses through Bank of America is overly burdensome because in order to access the funds on the Patient Refund Card, to request a check in lieu of the Patient Refund Card, or to even know the amount on the Patient Refund Card, she must activate the card by providing personal information to Bank of America.

Bratton filed her suit against SCL Health and argued the following counts: Count I-Equitable Constructive Trust; Count II-Conversion; Count III-Unjust Enrichment; Count IV-Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act; Count V-Money Had

and Received; and Count VI-Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief. Bratton also brought a Putative Class Action claim in her complaint.

In SCL Health's brief in support of summary judgment, it argued that Bratton's conversion claim fails because Bratton was not deprived of her money since she had unfettered access to the money. SCL Health argued that Bratton's unjust enrichment claim and constructive trust claims both fail because SCL Health did not receive any benefit conferred by Bratton. And SCL Health argued that Bratton's consumer protection act claim fails because Bratton cannot prove she sustained an ascertainable loss. In SCL Health's supplemental motion for summary judgment, SCL Health argued that Bratton's money had and received claim fails as a matter of law, and her declaratory judgment claim fails because she was not deprived of her money.

On May 30, 2019, the Court held a hearing over both parties' requests for summary judgment. During the hearing, SCL Health and Bratton reiterated their arguments made in their briefs. SCL Health pressed its argument that the Patient Refund Card Program has become a popular business method to refund money to individuals, because it gets the refund to an individual quicker, and the refund cards can be used anywhere a standard debit or credit card can be used.

SCL Health reasserted that if a patient does not want the Patient Refund Card, the patient can contact Bank of America to have a check issued to him or her at no charge. SCL Health argued any unclaimed funds escheat directly to the State of Montana after the specified period of time runs and that it does not receive the refunded amount if it has not been utilized by the patient.

During the hearing Bratton restated her argument that the agreement between SCL Health and Bank of America violated the agreement between she and SCL Health, because she did not consent to SCL Health using Bank of America to refund

her money. Bratton argued that, without consent, SCL Health could not legally give Bank of America her money in order for Bank of America to process her refund. Bratton further argued that because SCL Health gave her refund to Bank of America instead of giving the refunded money to her, SCL Health breached its duty owed to her. Bratton argued that her an equitable remedy does not need a party to have done something wrong, so even if the Court finds that SCL Health did not act in the wrong the Court should still find that SCL Health has not returned Bratton's money and find for her unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and money had and received claims.

#### **LEGAL STANDARD**

Summary judgment should be rendered when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is intended to encourage judicial economy by eliminating unnecessary trials in which no genuine issue of fact is present. *Belcher v. Department of State Lands*, 228 Mont. 252, 355, 742 P.2d 475 (1987) (citation omitted).

The moving party bears the burden of establishing both an absence of any genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. *Clover Leaf Dairy v. State*, 285 Mont. 380, 385, 948 P.2d 1164, 1168 (1997). Once the moving party meets its burden, the opposing party must present substantial evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. *Corporate Air v. Edwards Jet Ctr. Mont. Inc.*, 2008 MT 283, ¶ 25, 345 Mont. 336, 190 P.3d 1111 (citations omitted); *Steinback v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.*, 2000 MT 316, ¶ 11, 302 Mont. 483, 15 P.3d 872 (citations omitted). The opposing party must then prove by more than mere denial and speculation that there is

a genuine issue for trial. *Bruner v. Yellowstone County*, 272 Mont. 261, 264, 900 P.2d 901, 903 (1995).

All reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the offered proof must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. *Stanley L. & Carolyn M. Watkins Trust v. Lacosta*, 2004 MT 144, ¶ 16, 321 Mont. 432, 92 P.3d 620. The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should never be substituted for a trial if a factual controversy exists." *Williams v. Plum Creek Timber Co.*, 2011 MT 271, ¶ 41, 362 Mont. 368, 264 P.3d 1090 (citing *Spinler v. Allen*, 1999 MT 160, ¶ 16, 295 Mont. 139, 983 P.2d 348).

Partial summary judgment is appropriate where no material facts are at issue and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The court should determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue by examining the pleadings and evidence before it and by interrogating the attorneys. *Id.* 

#### DISCUSSION

SCL Health argued that all of Bratton's claims are subject to summary judgment because the facts regarding the Patient Refund Card Program precluded Bratton from establishing the elements of her claims. Bratton argued that SCL Health failed to recognize the genuine issue of material facts presented in its claims. Bratton also argued that the Court should grant summary judgment to her conversion claim, to her money had and received claim, and her declaratory judgment claim. SCL Health argued the civil theft claims depend on whether consent was needed for SCL Health to allow Bank of America to send out the Patient Refund Cards, and whether consent existed between Bratton and SCL Health. Bratton argued that due to the agreement between SCL Health and Bratton, SCL Health needed her consent for it to transfer its

contractual obligation to Bank of America regarding the refunding her money. Mont. Code Ann. § 28-1-1002.

#### I. Bratton's Conversion Claim

"Conversion has been defined as a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over one's property in denial of, or inconsistent with, the owner's right." *Gebhardt v. D.A. Davidson & Co.*, 203 Mont. 384, 389, 661 P.2d 855, 858 (1983). To succeed on a conversion claim, Bratton must prove: (1) her ownership and right of possession of the funds; (2) its conversion by SCL Health, meaning a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over Bratton's property in denial of, or inconsistent with Bratton's right, or an unauthorized assumption of dominion over personal property in hostility to Bratton's right of ownership; and (3) resulting damages. *Kingman v. Weightman*, 2017 MT 224, ¶12, 388 Mont. 481, 402 P.3d 1196. SCL Health and Bratton both requested a summary judgment ruling on the conversion claim.

SCL Health argued that Bratton cannot show that SCL Health converted any portion of her refunds, whether through assessment fees or by retention of unused funds after expiration of her cards. SCL Health argued that Bratton has had full access to her funds at all times since the issuance of both her Patient Refund Cards. SCL Health stated that Bratton can access her funds on the cards without incurring fees at any bank that accepts Mastercard, at numerous points of sale, at any of the nineteen Allpoint ATMs in Billings, Montana, or by requesting that Bank of America issue her a check for any unused funds. SCL Health argued that Bratton failed to establish how she was deprived of her right to possession of and use of her funds, and any actual damages that she has suffered. SCL Health also argued that Bratton was required to demand the return of her refund and SCL Health must have refused to return her

refund, since SCL Health lawfully acquired possession of Bratton's money. *See Beyerlein v. Whitcomb*, 95 Mont. 293, 298, 26 P.2d 349, 350 (1933).

argued the first element of conversion is met because there is no question regarding her ownership of the refund. Bratton argued that the second element of conversion is met because SCL Health gave her refund to Bank of America without her consent, thereby exercising dominion over her refund. And Bratton argued the third element of conversion is met because she suffered damages due to SCL Health giving control of her refund to Bank of America instead of giving her the refund. Bratton argued that SCL Health's reliance on *Feller v. First Interstate*, 2013 MT 90, 369 Mont. 444, 299 P.3d 338, regarding its argument that she suffered no damages was incorrect. The defendant in *Feller* returned Feller's full escrow account balance and included ten percent interest. *Feller*, ¶29. Bratton argued that SCL Health has committed conversion since she has not received her money, or her money with interest, and has suffered damages based on the findings the *Feller* Court made. Bratton also argued that SCL Health's reliance on *Beyerlein v. Whitcomb* is misplaced, because she never consented to allowing SCL Health give her money to Bank of America. Bratton therefore argued that a demand and refusal was not required.

The Court agrees that there is no dispute regarding Bratton's ownership of the money. However, the Court finds that SCL Health did not commit a conversion when Bank of America issued the two Patient Refund Cards. The Court finds that Bank of America issued Bratton's refund from a general account because SCL Health sends a spread sheet of patients who overpaid, or double paid, medical bills to Bank of America, and Bank of America issues the Patient Refund Card by taking funds out of SCL Health's account. Upon SCL Health's discovery that a patient is due a refund, a debtor and creditor relationship is created between SCL Health and the patient.

An action in conversion cannot lie against a general account as there can be no conversion of a debt. See *Free v. Elberson*, 157 Mont. 424, 435, 486 P.2d 857, 862 (Mont. 1971); *In re Wal-Mart & Hour Empl. Practices Litig.*, 490 F. Supp.2d 1091, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38075; *Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co.*, 227 Kan. 45, 605 P.2d 95, 1980 Kan. LEXIS 201; *Autoville v. Friedman*, 510 P.2d 400, 20 Ariz. App. 89; 1973 Ariz. App. LEXIS 635. Where there is no obligation to return identical money, but only a relationship of debtor and creditor, an action for conversion of the funds representing the indebtedness will not lie against the debtor. Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 8; *ADT Corp. v. DaimlerChryslor Corp.*, 261 F. Supp.2d 887, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7883. Therefore, the Court finds that there was no conversion. The Court not only finds that SCL Health refunded Bratton her money, but that the relationship between Bratton and SCL Health was a debtor and creditor relationship, and there can be no conversion of a debt. The inconvenience Bratton has argued regarding the Patient Refund Card is not grounds for a conversion claim.

#### II. Consent was not Needed for the Patient Refund Card

Bratton argued that SCL Health needed its consent in order to transfer the duty of refunding her money to Bank of America. SCL Health argued that it did not transfer any contractual or quasi-contractual duty to Bank of America, but instead authorized its bank to effectuate the transfer of currency. SCL Health argued that because consent was not needed to have its bank send a refund from its general account, it did not breach its contract with Bratton. SCL Health further argued that, under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 318 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981), it was not precluded from delegation of its duties because it remained liable for any breach that may have resulted. SCL Health argued that Bratton received her refund through a regulated payment device that provides access to the refunded money, and that SCL Health's

obligation to refund Bratton's money had been performed. Bratton argued that SCL Health did not follow the federal regulation mandates regarding disclosures of fees and card expiration. SCL Health argued that the Patient Refund Cards are not marketed to the public nor purchased by consumers, and that the federal regulations Bratton cited to are inapplicable because they only concern payroll cards. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Bulletin 2013-10 (September 12, 2013) (discussing Regulation E provisions applicable to payroll cards).

"Where payment or offer of payment of money is made a condition of an obligor's duty, payment or offer of payment in any manner current in the ordinary course of business satisfies the requirement unless the obligee demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of time reasonably necessary to procure it." Section 249 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Here, Bratton did not request her refund be provided in legal tender. Use of other methods of payments other than legal tender are sufficient to satisfy a monetary obligation. See Frandson v. Oasis Petroleum N. Am., LLC, 870 F.Supp.2d 726, 731 (D.N.D. 2012).

The Court finds that SCL Health did not need Bratton's consent to have its bank send Bratton a Patient Refund Card. SCL Health did not transfer its duty to Bank of America. SCL Health merely had Bank of America withdraw money from its general account and send the Patient Refund Card to Bratton. The Court finds that SCL Health's authorization for Bank of America to withdraw money from SCL Health's account to send to Bratton in the form of a Patient Refund Card is similar to the authorization of a wire transfer or cashier's check. SCL Health would not need Bratton's consent regarding a wire transfer or cashier's check, and the Court does not find consent by Bratton necessary just because SCL Health refunded Bratton's money in a manner Bratton found inconvenient.

### III. Bratton's Unjust Enrichment and Constructive Trust Claims

Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim for restitution to prevent or remedy inequitable gain by another. *N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church ex rel. Great Falls/Billings Dioceses*, 2013 MT 24, ¶¶36-39, 368 Mont. 330, 269 P.3d 450; Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §1 (2011). In order for Bratton to prevail on her unjust enrichment claim, and by extension her constructive trust claim, Bratton must show (1) she conferred a benefit upon SCL Health, (2) that SCL Health appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit, and (3) SCL Health accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable for SCL Health to retain the benefit without payment of its value. *Volk v. Goeser*, 2016 MT 61, ¶45, 382 Mont. 382, 367 P.3d 378. Forms of restitution available upon proof of an unjust enrichment claim include direct restoration of the benefit conferred or gained, or imposition of a constructive trust to the same effect. *Id.* The measure of restitution will be the amount SCL Health inequitably gained. *N. Cheyenne Tribe*, ¶38.

SCL Health argued that it was not unjustly enriched because it did not retain control over Bratton's refund. SCL Health argued that Bratton has retained full access to her refund and may retrieve her money on her Patient Refund Cards at any time, without incurring fees. SCL Health also argued that it will not receive the benefit of the money if Bratton never uses the Patient Refund Cards, or if she requests Bank of America to reimburse her by a check, because Bank of America will deposit any remaining card balance with the State of Montana after the five-year statutorily prescribed dormancy period as required by law under Mont. Code Ann. § 70-9-803(q). SCL Health further argued that if any of Bratton's remaining balance on her cards were to escheat to the State of Montana, Bratton could still retrieve her money from

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appropriate state authority. Mont. Code Ann. § 70-9-815 (specifying procedure for reclaiming unclaimed property escheated to the State of Montana).

Bratton argued that there are still disputed issues of material facts regarding the benefits SCL Health received from sending Bratton and other patients' monies to Bank of America to have it pay the refunds. Bratton argued that SCL Health received cost savings by switching from issuing refund checks in-house to providing Patient Refund Cards through Bank of America. Bratton further argued that it is unknown whether loans that SCL Health received from Bank of America were tied at all to its participation in the Patient Refund Card Program.

Unjust enrichment does not necessarily require proof of a wrongful act or conduct. Volk, ¶¶45 and 50. The Volk Court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust where the defendant had done nothing wrong. Id. Unjust enrichment merely requires proof that a party unjustly gained something of value, regardless of wrongful conduct. N. Cheyenne Tribe, ¶38. "A constructive trust arises when a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that the person holding title would be unjustly enriched if the holder were permitted to retain it." Mont. Code Ann. § 72-38-123.

The Court finds that SCL Health was not unjustly enriched. The Court does find that a benefit was given to SCL Health when Bratton paid SCL Health for the remaining balance before Bratton's secondary insurance covered the same bill Bratton had paid after her primary insurance covered the bulk of the hospital bill. The Court also finds that SCL Health had knowledge of the alleged benefit after it attempted to refund Bratton her money. However, SCL Health did not retain the benefit, because SCL Health authorized Bank of America to issue Bratton a refund. The Court finds that Bratton cannot meet all the elements to support her unjust enrichment claim. The Court

will therefore grant SCL Health's motion for summary judgment against Bratton's unjust enrichment claim. The Court will also grant SCL Health's motion for summary judgment against Bratton's constructive trust claim as well, because SCL Health was not unjustly enriched.

#### IV. Bratton's Consumer Protection Claim

Bratton argued that SCL Health violated the Montana Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter "MCPA"). To succeed on her MCPA claim, Bratton must prove that: (1) she is a consumer as defined in Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-102(1); (2) she suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal; and (3) her loss was caused by SCL Health's use or employment of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful by Montana Code Annotated § 30-14-103. *Higgins v. First Horizon National Corporation*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38331\*, No. CV-15-101-GF- BMM, 2018 WL 1203474, at \*30 (D. Mont. Mar. 8, 2018). The MCPA is broad in scope and is liberally construed with a view to affect its object and promote justice. *Baird v. Northwest Bank*, 225 Mont. 317, 327, 843 P.2d 327, 333 (1992). The MCPA prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. *Doherty v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n.*, & *CitiMortgage, Inc.*, 2014 MT 56, ¶ 21, 374 Mont. 151, 319 P.3d 1279 (2014).

SCL Health argued that Bratton's claim fails a matter of law because she cannot show she sustained an ascertainable loss. Generally, the ascertainable loss element is satisfied by an identifiable loss of money or property. *Jacobson v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC*, 2016 MT 101, ¶46, 383 Mont. 257, 371 P.3d 397. SCL Health argued that Bratton does not allege that she sustained an ascertainable loss because of SCL Health's alleged wrongdoing. SCL Health argued that Bratton does not claim she incurred a fee in using or accessing the funds on her Patient Refund Cards, and she cannot prove that such fees will necessarily be incurred. SCL Health also argued that

Patient Refund Cards remain available for her use.

Bratton cannot establish any ascertainable loss of the refunded amount, because her

Bratton argued she still has not received any portion of the \$27.75 that SCL Health owes her, and that the only way she can get her refund is by creating a Card Account with Bank of America, which, she argued, would require her to waive her rights, including her constitutional right under federal and state law to access the courts of Montana. Bratton also argued that SCL Health has not stated whether the account in which her money is being held is an interest-bearing account. Bratton further argued that the Patient Refund Card does not bear interest for her, but questions whether it bears interest for Bank of America. Bratton therefore argued that genuine issues of material fact exist to the amount of loss that she has suffered.

The Court finds that Bratton is a consumer as defined by Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-102 (Bratton purchased services from SLC Health for medical reasons). However, the Court finds that Bratton has not suffered an ascertainable loss. SCL Health refunded Bratton's money. SCL Health's practice of authorizing Bank of America to withdraw money from its general account to refund patients who have overpaid is not a deceptive business tactic. See Doherty, ¶21. The Court will grant SCL Health's motion for summary judgment against Bratton's MCPA claim.

# V. Bratton's Money Had and Received Claim

Montana case law has not dealt with money had and received in over five decades. The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure Form 7, along with past Montana case law, shows that Bratton must prove SCL Health received money to be paid to her, but it failed to do so. See Mont. R. Civ. P. Form 7 (setting forth the sole allegation that "Defendant owes plaintiff \$10,000 for money had and received from one G.H. on June 1, 1959, to be paid by defendant to plaintiff); Donovan v. McDevitt, 36 Mont. 61, 92

P.2d 49 (1907) (recognizing that plaintiff stated a claim for money had and received by alleging that defendant collected rent on plaintiff's property, but failed to apply that rent toward discharge of debt defendant owed plaintiff, as the parties agreed). This particular form of action was invented by common law judges to obtain relief from the common law procedure which afforded no remedy. *Grady v. Livingston*, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943). Similarly situated common-law jurisdictions have parallel claim requirements for money had and received. *Hunt v. Baldwin*, 68 S.W.3d 117, 132 (Tex. App. 2001) ("cause of action for money had and received arises when the defendant obtains money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff); *Mains v. City Title Ins. Co.*, 212 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1949) ("wherever one person has received money which belongs to another and which in equity and good conscience...should be returned").

SCL Health argued that it did not receive money that Bratton was entitled to, or that was to be paid to Bratton. SCL Health argued that Bratton paid the \$27.75 bill for healthcare services SCL Health provided, and SCL Health applied those funds to Bratton's account. SCL Health further argued that, after identifying the balance on Bratton's account, SCL Health refunded Bratton the amount she overpaid. SCL Health therefore argued that it had not deprived Bratton of her money.

Bratton argued that SCL Health owes her \$27.75. Bratton argued that SCL Health has tried to impose elements and technicalities not contained in the simplest action known to law. Bratton further argued that summary judgment lies for the common law claim of money had and received, and that the Court in equity should grant partial summary judgment for her money had and received claim because it is simply a claim for civil restitution.

The Court finds that Bratton paid the remaining balance of her medical bills, which came to \$27.75, and that her insurers ended up covering each bill after Bratton made her payments. However, the Court finds that SCL Health refunded Bratton her money via the Patient Refund Card provided through Bank of America. Therefore, SCL Health paid Bratton the money it owed her. The Court will grant SCL Health summary judgment for Bratton's money had and received claim.

## VI. Bratton's Declaratory Judgment Claim

The Court has the "power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claims." Mont. Code Ann. § 27-8-201. The Montana Supreme Court has found that a district court under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-8-201 can declare that a company is obligated to pay money. *Ridley v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co.*, 286 Mont. 325, 332, 951 P.2d 987, 991 (1997).

SCL Health argued that Bratton's claim for declaratory judgment must fail because her argument rests on her being deprived of her money to which she has had unfettered access. SCL Health argued that Bratton can retrieve her money at any time. Bratton argued that the Patient Refund Cards from Bank of America are not the equivalent of cash, that SCL Health cannot give her money to Bank of America without prior consent, that SCL Health is legally obligated to refund her money, and that SCL Health cannot mandate that she contract with Bank of America.

The Court finds SCL Health refunded Bratton's money. The Court finds that Bratton has had full access to her money and has not been deprived of her money as she alleged. The Court does not find that SCL Health was mandating Bratton to contract with Bank of America by issuing the Patient Refund Card. The Court will grant SCL Health's request for summary judgment for Bratton's declaratory judgment claim.

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#### **CONCLUSION AND ORDER**

The Court finds SCL Health refunded Bratton's money, and that Bratton has had unfettered access to her money. Bratton's argument of inconvenience is not grounds for a suit. The Court finds for SCL Health and will grant its motion and supplemental motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion and supplemental motion for summary judgment are **GRANTED** and Plaintiff's cross motions for partial summary judgment are **DENIED** 

DATED AND ORDERED this \_

 $\frac{13}{3}$  day of

\_, 2019.

HON. GREGORY R. TODD, District Court Judge

DV 18-1609

cc. Kathleen L. DeSoto, Attorney for Defendant Kathryn A. Reily, (Pro Hac Vice) Attorney for Defendant John Heenan, Attorney for Plaintiff Joe Cook, Attorney for Plaintiff

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the foregoing was
Caused to be served upon the parties or their
Attorneys of record at their last-known
Address on this 12th day of 2 upon , 2019

Michael Campbell

Law Clerk to HON. GREGORY R. TODD