On March 31, the CFPB and supporting amici submitted their briefs in the en banc rehearing of the PHH case. We have blogged extensively about the PHH case in which the D.C. Circuit is grappling with four critical issues: (i) whether the CFPB’s structure is constitutional (the CFPB says, yes), (ii) whether administrative actions brought by the CFPB are subject to a statute of limitations (the CFPB says, no), (iii) whether the CFPB’s interpretation of RESPA is correct (the CFPB says, yes), and (iv) whether the CFPB’s interpretation of RESPA, which differs from HUD’s historical interpretation, can be applied retroactively (the CFPB says, yes). We’ll focus here on the CFPB’s constitutional arguments.

The CFPB’s main argument is that under Humphry’s Executory and its progeny, there is only one relevant question to determining whether its structure is constitutional: Is its structure “of such a nature that [it] impede[s] the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty” to take care that the laws are faithfully executed? It insists that the  D.C. Circuit panel erred in undertaking “’an additional inquiry’ into whether an agency’s structure somehow threatens individual liberty.”

This is, of course, a strained argument. On the one hand the CFPB grants that its structure is a “departure from tradition” in that “most independent agencies[, like the FTC,] have been headed by multi-member commissions.” Yet, at the same time, the CFPB argues that the D.C. Circuit must slavishly apply precedents such as Humphry’s Executor which address (and, indeed, create) the “traditional” structure of independent agencies. It seems obvious that a different structure demands a different analysis.

In making this argument, the CFPB ignores the underlying separation of powers issue by insisting that the protections for individual liberty in the structure of other independent agencies are irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.  Counsel for PHH put it succinctly in recent testimony before a Senate sub-committee. Quoting James Madison, he pointed out that the consolidation of executive, judicial, and legislative power in one person is the “very definition of tyranny.”  By constituting other independent agencies as commissions, Congress prevented that consolidation and avoided the very problem the U.S. structure of government was designed to prevent. Yet, the CFPB argues that the commission and single-director structures are “indistinguishable” from a constitutional perspective.

The CFPB also ignores other features of agencies with a  commission structure that  make them more likely to operate as “independent” agencies, a precondition to the courts’ acceptance of their constitutionality. For example, no more than three of the FTC’s five commissioners can be of the same political party. As a result, the decision-making body at the FTC is required to receive input from those with differing views.  Not so with the CFPB director. He can set an agenda driven by the politics of his party without any check on his authority, even if that agenda is completely contrary to that of the President. This too is irrelevant from the CFPB’s perspective.