On December 12, the Credit Union National Association (“CUNA”) filed an amicus brief in D.C. Federal District Court opposing Leandra English’s motion for a preliminary injunction to block President Trump’s appointee for Acting CFPB Director, Mick Mulvaney, from exercising the powers of that office. The Court has already denied English’s motion for a temporary restraining order.

CUNA is the largest organization representing the nation’s 6,000 credit unions, which are heavily regulated by the CFPB. As such, it has a significant interest in the outcome of preliminary injunction hearing.

In its brief, CUNA argues that Mulvaney’s appointment was entirely proper under the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (“VRA”). CUNA further argues that the language in Dodd-Frank stating that the Deputy Director shall become the Acting Director in the “absence or on availability” of the Director covers temporary situations, like an accident requiring long term hospitalization of the Director. It does not cover a vacancy in the office of the Director, including one resulting from a resignation.

Under the VRA, when an office is vacant, the President has the power to appoint an acting officer to fill the post, subject to certain limitations. Indeed, when the VRA was passed, the Senate committee that considered the VRA explicitly stated that, “statutes enacted in the future purporting to or argued to be construed to govern the temporary filling of offices covered by this statute are not to be effective unless they expressly provide that they are superseding the Vacancies Reform Act.” So, because Dodd-Frank did not explicitly override the VRA, the VRA governs.

In addition, CUNA points out the serious constitutional problems that would result if the court adopted English’s position. If she is right, then a departing CFPB Director would have the power to appoint anyone as his or her successor, including non-citizens, through the simple expedient of naming him or her as the Deputy Director, while the President would have more limited powers of appointment under the VRA. That would give the CFPB Director more power than the President over an agency in the executive branch of government.

What’s more, English’s argument also implies that the President would be as unable to remove an Acting CFPB Director as he is the CFPB Director. That only exacerbates the constitutional defects that are at the heart of the PHH case, which we have blogged about extensively.

CUNA’s brief, which Ballard Spahr authored, highlights the industry perspective on why Leandra English is wrong and why the court should not try to unwind the President’s appointment of an Acting CFPB Director. We will continue to follow this unfolding saga closely.

A group of Democratic House members led by Rep. Maxine Waters has introduced H.R. 3937, the “Megabank Accountability and Consequences Act of 2017,” that would require federal bank regulators to consider the revocation of a bank’s charter and deposit insurance if the bank is found to have engaged in a “pattern or practice” of violations of federal consumer protection laws.  The bank’s officers and directors would also be subject to civil and criminal liability.

The 45-page bill includes 10 pages of “findings.”  One such finding is that since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, “some very large banking organizations operating in the United States have repeatedly violated Federal banking and consumer protection laws by engaging in unethical business practices” and that such banks “continue to act with impunity and violate numerous laws designed to protect consumers” despite enforcement actions that have been taken “most notably” by the CFPB.

Other findings include:

  • Senior bank executives “rarely have been held personally accountable for Federal consumer protection law violations and other illicit practices that occurred during their tenure.”
  • Federal prudential banking agencies, despite their wide-ranging statutory powers to address violations, “continue to rely on enforcement tools such as consent orders, cease and desist orders, and civil money penalties, even in instances when an institution’s violations have demonstrated unsafe or unsound business practices and past supervisory and enforcement actions have not sufficiently deterred illegal practices.”
  • Institutions have continued to engage in inappropriate and illegal practices because the federal prudential banking agencies have failed to “exercise statutorily provided enforcement authorities—such as revoking a bank’s national charter or terminating its Federal deposit insurance” or “hold the institution’s board of directors and senior officers accountable.”
  • Even if a bank’s violations of federal consumer financial laws “are deemed not to technically constitute unsafe or unsound banking practices, it may still demonstrate a pattern of wrongdoing causing unacceptable harm to its customers, such that continuing to enable it to engage in the business of banking distorts the regulatory purpose of providing national banks charters, deposit insurance and other benefits.”

The bill’s provisions would apply to a national bank, federal savings association, state Federal Reserve member bank, insured depository institution, foreign bank, or federal branch or agency of a foreign bank if such entity is “affiliated with a global systematically important bank holding company.”  A “global systematically important bank holding company” is defined as a bank holding company that the Fed has identified as a “global systematically important bank holding company” or a “global systematically important foreign banking organization” pursuant to existing federal regulations.

The bill contains a definition of “pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices or other violations related to consumer banking” that lists 7 types of activities and provides that a bank satisfies the “pattern or practice” definition if it engages in all of such activities “to the extent each activity was discovered or occurred at least once in the 10 years preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.”  It also contains a definition of “pattern or practice of violations of federal consumer protection laws.”

The bill includes the following requirements and sanctions:

  • If the OCC, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that a bank “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the OCC must “immediately initiate proceedings to terminate the [bank’s] Federal charter…or appoint a receiver for [the bank].”
  • If the FDIC, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that an insured depository institution “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the FDIC must “immediately initiate an involuntary termination of the [bank’s] deposit insurance.”
  • If the Fed, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that a state member bank “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the Fed must “immediately initiate proceedings to terminate such bank’s membership in the Federal Reserve System.”
  • If the Fed, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that a foreign bank or federal branch or agency of a foreign bank “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the Fed must “immediately initiate proceedings to terminate the foreign bank’s ability to operate in the United States” or recommend to the OCC that the branch’s or agency’s license be terminated.
  • If the OCC, Fed, or FDIC makes a determination to initiate proceedings to terminate a bank’s charter or deposit insurance, the agency must notify the bank “that removal is required of any director or senior officers responsible, as determined by [that agency], for overseeing any division of the [bank] during the time the [bank] was engaging in the identified pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices.”  Any current or former director or senior officer determined to have such responsibility “shall also be permanently banned from working as an employee, officer, or director of any other banking organization.”
  • If the FDIC determines that an insured depository institution “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm” or is notified by the OCC or Fed of the termination of a bank’s charter or an agency’s or branch’s license, the FDIC must not only initiate an involuntary termination of deposit insurance, it also must place the institution into receivership and can transfer the institution’s assets as provided in the bill.
  • Every “executive officer and director” of a national bank or federal savings association or a branch, representative office, or agency of a federally-licensed foreign bank must annually certify in writing to the appropriate banking agency, the CFPB, and any relevant federal law enforcement agency, that he or she has “regularly reviewed the institution’s lines of business and conducted due diligence to ensure,” that the institution (1) has established and maintained internal risk controls to identify significant federal law consumer compliance deficiencies and weaknesses, (2) has promptly disclosed all known violations of applicable federal consumer protection laws to the CFPB and appropriate banking agency, (3) is taking all reasonable steps to correct any identified federal law consumer compliance deficiencies and weakness based on prior examinations, and (4) is in substantial compliance with all federal consumer protection laws.
  • An officer or director who submits a certification that contains a false statement is subject to a fine or imprisonment if the statement is “done knowingly” or “done intentionally.”
  • An officer or director who knowingly violates any federal consumer protection law or directs any of the institution’s agents, officers, or directors to violate such a law is personally liable for any damages sustained by the institution or any other person as a result of the violation.  An officer or director who knowingly causes an institution to violate any federal consumer protection law or directs any of the institution’s agents, officers, or directors to commit a violation that results in the director or officer “being personally unjustly enriched and the institution being conducted in an unsafe and unsound manner” can be fined in an amount up to all of the compensation he or she received during the period in which the violations occurred or in the one to three years preceding discovery of the violations, and is subject to up to 5 years imprisonment.  The OCC, Fed, or FDIC, as applicable, must remove an officer or director who engaged in the foregoing conduct from his or her position and permanently ban such person from being involved in the operation and management of a federally-chartered or federally-insured bank.

Were it to become law, the bill’s certification requirement would likely make it very difficult for banks to attract and retain highly-qualified officers and directors.  It could also lead to instability in the banking system by creating a  “run” on deposits by depositors of a bank that became subject to the bill’s sanctions, particularly those whose deposits at the bank exceeded the insured deposit limit.

Fortunately, given the large Republican majority in the House, the bill is very unlikely to advance.

 

Among the more than 20 bills that the House Financial Services Committee is scheduled to mark-up this Wednesday, October 11, is a bill to provide a “Madden fix” as well as several others relevant to consumer financial services providers.

These bills are the following:

  • H.R. 3299, “Protecting Consumers’ Access to Credit Act of 2017.  In Madden, the Second Circuit ruled that a nonbank that purchases loans from a national bank could not charge the same rate of interest on the loan that Section 85 of the National Bank Act allows the national bank to charge.  The bill would add the following language to Section 85 of the National Bank Act: “A loan that is valid when made as to its maximum rate of interest in accordance with this section shall remain valid with respect to such rate regardless of whether the loan is subsequently sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred to a third party, and may be enforced by such third party notwithstanding any State law to the contrary.”
    This language is identical to language in a bill introduced in July 2017 by Democratic Senator Mark Warner as well as language in the Financial CHOICE Act and the Appropriations Bill that is also intended to override Madden.  Like those bills, H.R. 3299 would add the same language (with the word “section” changed to “subsection” when appropriate) to the provisions in the Home Owners’ Loan Act, the Federal Credit Union Act, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that provide rate exportation authority to, respectively, federal savings associations, federal credit unions, and state-chartered banks.  In the view of Isaac Boltansky of Compass Point, the bill is likely to be enacted in this Congress.
  • H.R. 2706, “Financial Institution Consumer Protection Act of 2017.”  This bill is intended to prevent a recurrence of “Operation Chokepoint,” the federal enforcement initiative involving various agencies, including the DOJ, the FDIC, and the Fed. Initiated in 2012, Operation Chokepoint targeted banks serving online payday lenders and other companies that have raised regulatory or “reputational” concerns.  The bill includes provisions that (1) prohibit a federal banking agency from (i) requesting or ordering a depository institution to terminate a specific customer account or group of customer accounts, or (ii) attempting to otherwise restrict or discourage a depository institution from entering into or maintaining a banking relationship with a specific customer or group of customers. unless the agency has a material reason for doing so and such reason is not based solely on reputation risk, and (2) require a federal banking agency that requests or orders termination of specific customer account or group of customer accounts to provide written notice to the institution and customer(s) that includes the agency’s justification for the termination.  (In August 2017, the DOJ sent a letter to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee in which it confirmed the termination of Operation Chokepoint.  Acting Comptroller Noreika in remarks last month, in which he also voiced support for “Madden fix” legislation, indicated that the OCC had denounced Operation Choke Point.)
  • H.R. 3072, “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Examination and Reporting Threshold Act of 2017.”  The bill would raise the asset threshold for banks subject to CFPB supervision from total assets of more than $10 billion to total assets of more than $50 billion.
  • H.R. 1116, “Taking Account of Institutions with Low Operation Risk Act of 2017.”  The bill includes a requirement that for any “regulatory action,” the CFPB, and federal banking agencies must consider the risk profile and business models of each type of institution or class of institutions that would be subject to the regulatory action and tailor the action in a manner that limits the regulatory compliance and other burdens based on the risk profile and business model of the institution or class of institutions involved.  The bill also includes a look-back provision that would require the agencies to apply the bill’s requirements to all regulations adopted within the last seven years and revise any regulations accordingly within 3 years.  A “regulatory action” would be defined as “any proposed, interim, or final rule or regulation, guidance, or published interpretation.”
  • H.R. 2954, “Home Mortgage Disclosure Adjustment Act.”  The bill would amend the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to create exemptions from HMDA’s data collection and disclosure requirements for depository institutions (1) with respect to closed-end mortgage loans, if the institution originated fewer than 1,000 such loans in each of the two preceding years, and (2) with respect to open-end lines of credit, if the institution originated fewer than 2,000 such lines of credit in each of the two preceding years.  (An amendment in the nature of a substitute would lower these thresholds to fewer than 500 closed-end mortgage loans and fewer than 500 open-end lines of credit.)
  • H.R. 1699, “Preserving Access to Manufactured Housing Act of 2017.”  The bill would amend the Truth in Lending Act and the Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (SAFE Act) to generally exempt a retailer of manufactured housing from TILA’s “mortgage originator” definition and the SAFE Act’s “loan originator” definition.  It would also increase TILA’s “high-cost mortgage” triggers for manufactured housing financing.
  • H.R. 2396, “Privacy Notification Technical Clarification Act.”  This bill would amend the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s requirements for providing an annual privacy notice.  (An amendment in the nature of a substitute is expected to be offered.)

Earlier this week the CFPB released its Summer 2017 Supervisory Highlights, which covers supervisory activities generally completed between January through June of 2017. The report touts the $14 million total restitution payments consumers received due to nonpublic supervisory activities during this period-plus the approximately $1.15 million in consumer remediation and $1.75 million in civil monetary penalties resulting from public enforcement actions that grew out of or were bolstered by CFPB examinations.

The report includes discussions of the following topics:

Auto Loan Servicing: The publication addresses repossession practices by auto loan servicers, stating that in the course of examinations the Bureau found that “one or more entities were repossessing vehicles after the repossession was supposed to be cancelled,” and concluding that the servicer(s) had committed an unfair practice by repossessing vehicles where “borrowers had brought the account current, entered an agreement with the servicer to avoid repossession, or made payments sufficient to stop the repossession, where reasonably practicable given the timing of the borrower’s action.”

Credit Card Account Management: The report focuses on four alleged credit-card related practices: (1) failure to provide tabular account-opening disclosures as required by Regulation Z (the table set forth in Appendix G-17); (2) deceptive misrepresentations to consumers regarding costs and availability of pay-by-phone options; (3) deceptive misrepresentations to consumers about the benefits of debt cancellation products; and (4) noncompliance with requirements related to billing error resolution and liability for unauthorized transactions.

Debt Collection: According to the report, the CFPB uncovered various FDCPA violations in the course of examinations of larger participants in the debt collection market. These alleged violations include unauthorized communications with third parties, false representations made to authorized credit card users regarding their liability for debts, false representations regarding credit reports, and communications with consumers at inconvenient times.

Deposit Accounts: The CFPB also claims to have found a number of Regulation E and UDAAP violations in connection with deposit accounts offered by banks. The alleged violations relate to (1) the freezing of customer deposit accounts relating to suspicious activity observed by banks; (2) misrepresentations about fee waivers for deposit products subject to a monthly service fee; (3) violations of error resolution requirements under Regulation E; and (4) deceptive statements about overdraft protection products.

Mortgage Origination and Servicing: The report details the results of supervision following the CFPB’s first round of mortgage examinations for compliance with the Bureau’s “Know Before You Owe” mortgage disclosure rule. The publication states that “for the most part, supervised entities, both banks and nonbanks, were able to effectively implement and comply with the Know Before You Owe mortgage disclosure rule changes,” but notes that examiners did find some violations relating to the content and timing of Loan Estimates and Closing Disclosure. Other origination practices addressed in the report include the failure to reimburse unused portions of service deposits and the inclusion of an arbitration notice on certain residential mortgage loan notes that was held to violate Regulation Z even though the note apparently lacked an arbitration provision. On the servicing side, the report focuses on violations of Regulation X in connection with assisting borrowers complete loss mitigation applications, and the inclusion of broad waiver of rights clauses in short sale and cash-for-keys agreements as a UDAAP. The report also cites fair lending concerns identified during examinations of mortgage servicers relating to data quality issues and “a lack of readily-accessible information” concerning borrower characteristics.

Short-Term Small Dollar Lending: The CFPB cites a number of alleged UDAAP violations, such as workplace collection calls, repeated collection calls to third parties, misrepresentations in marketing about small dollar loan products, misrepresentations about the use of references provided by borrowers in connection with loan applications, and the handling of unauthorized debits and overpayments.

Statistics Regarding CFPB’s Action Review Committee Process: Another notable aspect of the report is the inclusion of new statistics about the Bureau’s Action Review Committee (ARC) process, which senior executives in the CFPB’s Division of Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending use to decide whether issues that come up in examinations will be handled using a confidential supervisory action or will be investigated for possibly bringing a public enforcement action. The report includes a table detailing the total number of ARC decisions made—and the outcomes of such decisions—for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Importantly, only a subset of CFPB matters go through the ARC process, and of these matters, 24.59% were deemed “appropriate for further investigation for possible public enforcement action.” A further 11.48% of these matters were determined to be appropriate in part for further investigation for public enforcement, and in part for resolution through confidential supervisory action. Finally, the CFPB commits in the report to publishing ARC data at the end of each fiscal year (starting with 2017 data to be published in its upcoming Fall 2017 Supervisory Highlights).

As a general matter, we should note that many of the issues discussed in the report appear to stem from system errors and failures to monitor third party vendors and service providers. Given that the CFPB now regularly conducts examinations of service providers, both banks and non-banks should pay careful attention and seek advice from outside counsel in managing their relationships with outside service providers—especially since the CFPB has taken the position that a company can be vicariously liable for violations committed by its service providers.

As expected, the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (FFIEC) member agencies issued new data resubmission guidelines under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) effective for the 2018 data collection year.  The change coincides with the substantial expansion of the HMDA data reporting fields that is effective January 1, 2018.

When examining an institution’s HMDA Loan Application Register (LAR), regulators will assess if the correction and resubmission of any data is required based on a review of a sample of reported loans.  Currently for institutions that have a total of less than 100,000 loans or applications on their annual LAR, which is the vast majority of HMDA reporting institutions, (1) an institution must correct and resubmit its entire LAR if 10% or more or of the entries in the sample contain errors, and (2) an institution must correct and resubmit an individual data field in the LAR if there are errors in that field with 5% or more of the entries in the sample.  An institution can be required to correct and resubmit data even if the 10% or 5% thresholds are not reached, if the errors would make analysis of the institution’s data unreliable.  Regulators will first assess a smaller set of entries in a LAR, and if one or no errors are found they typically cease the verification process at that point.

Under the new guidelines, there are revised thresholds for requiring resubmission, and for assessing if a full review of the sample will be performed based on errors in the initial smaller set of loans.  Assessment of the data will be conducted on an individual data field basis.  The new testing sample sizes and thresholds are as follows:

For institutions with fewer than 30 LAR entries, the resubmission threshold is still 3, so the effective resubmission threshold percentage is higher than 10%.  As is the case currently, even if the thresholds are not met an institution can be required to correct one or more data fields and resubmit one or more data fields in its HMDA LAR if examiners have a reasonable basis to believe that errors in the field or fields will likely make analysis of the HMDA data unreliable.

Under the revised guidelines, if an institution has a total of 1,000 entries on its LAR, the regulator would first review an initial sample of 35 loans.  If the regulator finds two or more errors in a data field, the regulator would then review the full 79 loan sample.  If four or more errors are found in any data field, the institution would be required to resubmit its LAR with the applicable data field corrected.

Unlike the current approach, under the new guidelines there are tolerances for certain data fields, and an error within the applicable tolerance will not be considered an error for either threshold.  The tolerances are as follows:

  • Date of Application: Three calendar days or less with regard to the date the application was received or date shown on application form and the date reported in the LAR.
  • Loan Amount: One thousand dollars or less in the amount of the covered loan or loan applied for and the amount reported in the LAR.
  • Date Action Taken: Three calendar days or less with regard to the date the action was taken and the date reported in the LAR, provided that the difference does not result in reporting data for the wrong calendar year.
  • Income: Errors in rounding the gross annual income relied upon to the nearest thousand.

Subject to an exception, for purposes of the guidelines a “data field” generally refers to an individual HMDA Filing Instructions Guide (FIG) field, and such fields are identified by a distinct Data Field Number and Data Field Name.  The July 2017 version of the FIG for data collected in 2018 is available here.    The exception is for information on the ethnicity or race of an applicant or borrower, for which a data field consists of a group of FIG fields as follows:

  • The Ethnicity of Applicant or Borrower data field group—comprised of six FIG fields with information on an applicant’s or borrower’s ethnicity (FIG Data Field Numbers 19-24);
  • The Ethnicity of Co-Applicant or Co-borrower data field group—comprised of six FIG fields with information on a co-applicant’s or co-borrower’s ethnicity (FIG Data Field Numbers 25-30);
  • The Race of Applicant or Borrower data field group—comprised of eight FIG fields with information on an applicant’s or borrower’s race (FIG Data Field Numbers 33-40); and
  • The Race of Co-Applicant or Co-borrower data field group—comprised of eight FIG fields with information on a co-applicant’s or co-borrower’s race (FIG Data Field Numbers 41-48)

If one or more of the six data fields for such a data field group has errors, this would count as one error.

 

The CFPB has issued its eleventh Semi-Annual Report to the President and Congress covering the period October 1, 2016 through March 31, 2017.

The 178-page report recycles information from previously-issued CFPB reports and reviews ongoing and past developments, which we have covered in previous blog posts.

By way of aggregate statistics, the report indicates that in the six-month period it covers, CFPB supervisory actions resulted in financial institutions providing more than $6.2 million in redress to over 16,549 consumers.  It also indicates that during that period, the CFPB announced orders in enforcement actions providing for approximately $200 million in total relief for consumers and over $43 million in civil money penalties.  According to the report, the CFPB had 1,671 employees as of March 1, 2017.

While the amounts of consumer relief and civil money penalties are more than the corresponding amounts reported by the CFPB in its last Semi-Annual Report covering the period April 1, 2016 to September 30, 2016 ($40 million and $13.7 million, respectively), the amount of consumer redress from supervisory actions is substantially less than the corresponding amount reported by the CFPB in the prior report.  The prior report indicated consumer redress in supervisory actions of more than $14 million.

 

 

The CFPB’s newly-released Spring 2017 edition of Supervisory Highlights covers supervisory activities generally completed between September and December 2016.  The report indicates that  supervisory resolutions resulted in restitution payments of approximately $6.1 million to more than 16,000 consumers and notes that “[r]ecent non-public resolutions were reached in several auto finance origination matters.”  It also indicates that recent supervisory activities have either led to or supported five recent public enforcement actions, resulting in over $39 million in consumer remediation and $19 million in civil money penalties.  The five enforcement actions are described in the report.  (They include the CFPB’s March 2017 consent order with Experian and its December 2016 consent order with Moneytree.)

The report includes the following:

Mortgage origination.  The report discusses compliance with the Regulation Z ability-to-repay (ATR) requirements, specifically how examiners assess a creditor’s ATR determination that includes reliance on verified assets rather than income.  It states that to evaluate whether a creditor’s ATR determination is reasonable and in good faith, examiners will review relevant lending policies and procedures and assess the facts and circumstances of each extension of credit in sample loan files.  After determining whether a creditor considered the required underwriting factors, examiners will determine whether the creditor properly verified the information it relied upon to make an ATR determination.  When a creditor relies on assets and not income for an ATR determination, examiners evaluate whether the creditor reasonably and in good faith determined that the consumer’s verified assets were sufficient to establish the consumer’s ability to repay the loan according to its terms in light of the creditor’s consideration of other required ATR factors (such as the consumer’s mortgage payments on the transaction and other debt obligations).  The report states that in considering such factors, a creditor relying on assets and not income could, for example, assume income is zero and properly determine that no income is necessary to make a reasonable determination of the consumer’s ability to repay the loan in light of the consumer’s  verified assets.  (The report notes that a creditor that considers monthly residual income to determine repayment ability for a consumer with no verified income could allocate verified assets to offset what would be a negative monthly residual income.)

The report also discusses a creditor’s reliance on a down payment to support the repayment ability of a consumer with no verified assets or income.  It states that a down payment cannot be treated as an asset for purposes of considering a consumer’s assets or income under the ATR rule and, standing alone, will not support a reasonable and good faith determination of ability to repay.  The report also indicates that even where a loan program as a whole has a history of strong performance, the CFPB “cannot anticipate circumstances where a creditor could demonstrate that it reasonably and good faith determined ATR for a consumer with no verified income or assets based solely on down payment size.”

Mortgage servicing.  The report indicates that examiners continue to find “serious problems” with the loss mitigation process at certain servicers, including “one or more servicers” that after failing to request additional documents from borrowers needed to obtain complete loss mitigation applications denied the applications for missing such documents.  In particular, examiners found that “one or more servicers” did not properly classify loss mitigation applications as facially complete after receiving the documents and information requested in the loss mitigation acknowledgment notice and failed to provide the Regulation X foreclosure protections for facially complete applications to those borrowers.  Examiners also determined that “servicer(s)” violated Regulation X by failing to maintain policies and procedures reasonably designed to properly evaluate a loss mitigation applicant for all loss mitigation options for which the applicant might be eligible.  Another servicing issue observed by examiners was the use of phrases such as “Misc. Expenses” or “Charge for Service” on periodic statements.  Examiners found such phrases to be insufficiently specific or adequate to comply with the Regulation Z requirement to describe transactions on periodic statements.

Student loan servicing.  Examiners found that “servicers” had engaged in an unfair practice by failing to reverse the financial consequences of an erroneous deferment termination, such as late fees charged for non-payment when the borrower should have been in deferment, and interest capitalization.  Examiners also found that “one or more servicers” had engaged in deceptive practices by telling borrowers that interest would capitalize at the end of a deferment period but, for borrowers who had been placed in successive periods of forbearance or deferment, capitalized interest after each period of deferment or forbearance.  Although the CFPB provides no support for this statement, it asserts that “[r]easonable consumers likely understood this to mean interest would capitalize once, when the borrower ultimately exited deferment and entered repayment.”

Service provider examinations.  We recently blogged about the announcement made at an American Bar Association meeting by Peggy Twohig, the CFPB’s Assistant Director for Supervision Policy, that the CFPB had begun to examine service providers on a regular, systematic basis, particularly those supporting the mortgage industry.  In the report, the CFPB discusses its plans to directly examine key service providers to institutions it supervises.  It states that its initial work involves conducting baseline reviews of some service providers to learn about their structure, operations, compliance systems, and compliance management systems.  The CFPB also confirms that “in more targeted work, the CFPB is focusing on service providers that directly affect the mortgage origination and servicing markets.”  The CFPB plans to shape its future service provider supervisory activities based on what it learns through its initial work.

Fair lending.  The report indicates that as of April 2017, examiners are relying on updated proxy methodology for race and ethnicity in their fair lending analysis of non-mortgage products.  The updated methodology reflects new surname data released by the U.S. Census Bureau in December 2016.

Spike and trend complaint monitoring.  The report indicates that, for purposes of its risk-based prioritization of examinations, the CFPB is now continuously monitoring spikes and trends in consumer complaints.  To do so, the CFPB is using an automated monitoring capability that relies on algorithms to “identify short, medium, and long-term changes in complaint volumes in daily, weekly, and quarterly windows.”  The CFPB states that the tool works “regardless of company size, random variation, general complaint growth, and seasonality” and is intended to be an “early warning system.”  Unfortunately, the validity of the complaints does not seem to factor into the algorithm.

 

The CFPB has issued its April 2017 complaint report that highlights student loan complaints.  The report also highlights complaints from consumers in Nevada and the Las Vegas metro area.

On June 8, 2017, from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. ET, Ballard Spahr will hold a webinar, “CFPB Criticism of Student Loan Servicers – What’s Coming Next?”  Click here to register.

General findings include the following:

  • As of April 1, 2017, the CFPB handled approximately 1,163,200 complaints nationally, including approximately 28,000 complaints in March 2017.
  • Debt collection continued to be the most-complained-about financial product or service in March 2017, representing about 31 percent of complaints submitted.
  • Debt collection complaints, together with complaints about credit reporting and student loans, collectively represented about 65 percent of the complaints submitted in March 2017.
  • Complaints about student loans showed the greatest month-over-month decrease, decreasing 20 percent from February 2017.  At the same time, student loans had the greatest percentage increase based on a three-month average, increasing about 325 percent from the same time last year (January 2016 to March 2016 compared with January 2017 to March 2017).  In February 2016, the CFPB began accepting complaints about federal student loans.  Previously, such complaints were directed to the Department of Education.  As we have noted in blog posts about prior CFPB monthly complaint reports issued beginning in April 2016, rather than reflecting an increase in the number of borrowers making student loan complaints, the increasing percentages represented by student loan complaints received by the CFPB most likely reflected the change in where such complaints were sent.  For the first time, the CFPB has acknowledged the impact of such change, stating “Part of [the 325 percent year-to-year increase] can be attributed to the CFPB updating its student loan complaint form to accept complaints about Federal student loan servicing, starting in late February 2016.”
  • Payday loans showed the greatest percentage decrease based on a three-month average, decreasing about 29 percent from the same time last year (January 2016 to March 2016 compared with January 2017 to March 2017).  Complaints during those periods decreased from 417 complaints in 2016 to 298 complaints in 2017.  In the February and March 2017 complaint reports, payday loans also showed the greatest percentage decrease based on a three-month average.

Findings regarding student loan complaints include the following:

  • The CFPB has handled approximately 44,400 student loan complaints since July 21, 2011, representing 4 percent of all complaints.
  • The most common issues identified in complaints involved problems dealing with lenders or servicers and being unable to repay loans.
  • Federal student loan borrowers contacting servicers about financial distress complained about receiving information about hardship forbearance and deferment instead of options such as income-driven repayment plans.  Borrowers also complained about difficulty enrolling in such plans and unclear guidance when seeking to switch plans.
  • Federal student loan borrowers reported not receiving sufficient information from servicers to meet recertification deadlines for income-driven repayment plans.  They also complained about misapplication of payments, such as payments being applied to all accounts handled by a servicer rather than specific accounts and overpayments intended to reduce the principal balance being treated as early payments that put the accounts in paid ahead status.  Borrowers also reported various problems with Public Student Loan Forgiveness and other forgiveness programs, such as not being enrolled in a qualifying program despite years of making payments.
  • Non-federal loan borrowers complained about misapplied payments and inaccurate accounting of payments.
  • Federal and non-federal loan borrowers reported issues involving incorrect reporting to consumer reporting companies.  (The CFPB does not provide enough information in the report to determine the number of complaints that involved the issues described above.)

Findings regarding complaints from Nevada consumers include the following:

  • As of April 1, 2017, approximately 14,600 complaints were submitted by Nevada consumers of which approximately 10,800 were from Las Vegas consumers.
  • Debt collection was the most-complained-about product, representing 29 percent of all complaints submitted by Nevada consumers, which was higher than the national average rate of 27 percent of all complaints submitted by consumers.
  • Average monthly complaints received from Nevada consumers increased 17 percent from the same time last year (January 2016 to March 2016 compared with January 2017 to March 2017), lower than the increase of 19 percent nationally.

 

 

The CFPB recently released a “Special Edition” of its Supervisory Highlights that focuses exclusively on data accuracy issues in consumer credit reporting and the handling and resolution of consumer disputes. The report describes the observations of CFPB examiners during examinations of both consumer reporting agencies and the creditors and other companies that furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.

The CFPB acknowledges that consumer reporting agencies have made significant advances in promoting the accuracy of data reported to them by overseeing data furnishers and enhancing the dispute resolution process, but the CFPB believes that continued improvements are still necessary in these areas. In their examinations of furnishers, the CFPB examiners found “CMS weaknesses and numerous violations of the FCRA and Regulation V that required corrective action by furnisher(s).”

The CFPB’s “supervisory observations” include the following:

  • Data governance. CFPB examiners found that one or more consumer reporting agencies had decentralized data governance functions and undefined data governance responsibilities, a lack of quality control policies and procedures, and inconsistent practices for vetting furnishers and providing data quality feedback to them. CFPB examiners also found that one or more furnishers had weaknesses in its compliance management system, including weak oversight by management over data furnishing practices and no formal data governance program.
  • Reinvestigation of disputes. CFPB examiners found that one or more consumer reporting agencies did not comply with its obligation to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation when consumers dispute the completeness or accuracy of items in their consumer files. CFPB examiners also found that one or more consumer reporting agencies did not review and consider certain categories of documentary evidence in support of a dispute submitted by consumers. Furthermore, CFPB examiners found that one or more furnishers’ policies and procedures failed to promote reasonable investigations of disputes.
  • Required dispute notices. One or more consumer reporting agencies examined by the CFPB failed to provide notification of a consumer dispute within five business days to the furnisher who provided the information because the furnishers’ contact information was no longer valid at the time of the consumer’s dispute. CFPB examiners also found that one or more consumer reporting agencies sent dispute notices to consumers that failed to clearly articulate the results of the dispute investigation as required by the FCRA. In cases where furnishers decided to not investigate disputed information, the CFPB found that one or more furnishers failed to provide consumers with proper notice of a reasonable determination that a dispute was frivolous or irrelevant.
  • Quality control. One or more furnishers examined by the CFPB failed to perform quality checks on the data furnished to consumer reporting agencies, failed to conduct ongoing periodic evaluations or audits of furnishing practices, and failed to conduct audits of disputed information to identify and correct root causes of any inaccurate furnishing.
  • Data accuracy requirements. CFPB examiners found that one or more furnishers provided consumer information to consumer reporting agencies while knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the information was inaccurate, including information that consumers were delinquent, had no payment history, or had an unpaid charged-off balance when they had settled the account in full.

The report indicates that the consumer reporting market is a “high priority” for the CFPB. Notably, the report states that the CFPB has “targeted substantial resources” to improving the accuracy of consumer information and will continue to do so.

The CFPB recently released a “Special Edition” of its Supervisory Highlights that focuses exclusively on data accuracy issues in consumer credit reporting and the handling and resolution of consumer disputes. The report describes the observations of CFPB examiners during examinations of both consumer reporting agencies and the creditors and other companies that furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.

The CFPB acknowledges that consumer reporting agencies have made significant advances in promoting the accuracy of data reported to them by overseeing data furnishers and enhancing the dispute resolution process, but the CFPB believes that continued improvements are still necessary in these areas. In their examinations of furnishers, the CFPB examiners found “CMS weaknesses and numerous violations of the FCRA and Regulation V that required corrective action by furnisher(s).”

The CFPB’s “supervisory observations” include the following:

  • Data governance. CFPB examiners found that one or more consumer reporting agencies had decentralized data governance functions and undefined data governance responsibilities, a lack of quality control policies and procedures, and inconsistent practices for vetting furnishers and providing data quality feedback to them. CFPB examiners also found that one or more furnishers had weaknesses in its compliance management system, including weak oversight by management over data furnishing practices and no formal data governance program.
  • Reinvestigation of disputes. CFPB examiners found that one or more consumer reporting agencies did not comply with its obligation to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation when consumers dispute the completeness or accuracy of items in their consumer files. CFPB examiners also found that one or more consumer reporting agencies did not review and consider certain categories of documentary evidence in support of a dispute submitted by consumers. Furthermore, CFPB examiners found that one or more furnishers’ policies and procedures failed to promote reasonable investigations of disputes.
  • Required dispute notices. One or more consumer reporting agencies examined by the CFPB failed to provide notification of a consumer dispute within five business days to the furnisher who provided the information because the furnishers’ contact information was no longer valid at the time of the consumer’s dispute. CFPB examiners also found that one or more consumer reporting agencies sent dispute notices to consumers that failed to clearly articulate the results of the dispute investigation as required by the FCRA. In cases where furnishers decided to not investigate disputed information, the CFPB found that one or more furnishers failed to provide consumers with proper notice of a reasonable determination that a dispute was frivolous or irrelevant.
  • Quality control. One or more furnishers examined by the CFPB failed to perform quality checks on the data furnished to consumer reporting agencies, failed to conduct ongoing periodic evaluations or audits of furnishing practices, and failed to conduct audits of disputed information to identify and correct root causes of any inaccurate furnishing.
  • Data accuracy requirements. CFPB examiners found that one or more furnishers provided consumer information to consumer reporting agencies while knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the information was inaccurate, including information that consumers were delinquent, had no payment history, or had an unpaid charged-off balance when they had settled the account in full.

The report indicates that the consumer reporting market is a “high priority” for the CFPB. Notably, the report states that the CFPB has “targeted substantial resources” to improving the accuracy of consumer information and will continue to do so.