CFPB Supervision

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The CFPB’s Winter 2019 Supervisory Highlights discusses the Bureau’s examination findings in the areas of automobile loan servicing, deposits, mortgage loan servicing, and remittances.  We discussed the Bureau’s auto loan servicing findings in a separate blog post.  In this blog post, we focus on the Bureau’s additional findings.

Although issued under Director Kraninger’s leadership, the Winter 2019 Supervisory Highlights covers examinations generally completed between June and November 2018 when Mick Mulvaney was Acting Director.  It represents the CFPB’s second Supervisory Highlights covering supervisory activities conducted under Mr. Mulvaney’s leadership.  Like the Summer 2019 Supervisory Highlights, the Winter 2019 issue contains the following language in its introduction:

It is important to keep in mind that institutions are subject only to the requirements of relevant laws and regulations.  The information contained in Supervisory Highlights is disseminated to help institutions and better understand how the Bureau examines institutions for compliance with those requirements.  In addition, the legal violations described in this and previous issues of Supervisory Highlights are based on the particular facts and circumstances reviewed by the Bureau as part of its examinations.  A conclusion that a legal violation exists on the facts and circumstances described here may not lead to such a finding under different circumstances.

Also like the Summer 2019 Supervisory Highlights, the new issue’s introduction and the Bureau’s press release about the report does not include any statements touting the amount of restitution payments that resulted from supervisory resolutions or the amounts of consumer remediation or civil money penalties resulting from public enforcement actions connected to recent supervisory activities.  (The report does, however, include summaries of the terms of five consent orders entered into by the Bureau, including its settlements with Cash Tyme, a payday retail lender, and Cash Express, a small-dollar lender.)

Key findings include:

Deposits.  CFPB examiners found that one or more institutions engaged in deceptive acts or practices by representing that payments made through their online bill-pay service would be debited no sooner than the date selected by the consumer and failing to disclose (or disclose adequately) that the debit might occur earlier than that date when the payee only accepted a paper check.  Such paper checks were sent by the institution several days before the consumer’s designated payment date, at the institution’s discretion, and would be debited from the consumer’s account when presented and cashed by the payee.  As a result, the debit could have occurred earlier or later than the designated date.  In response to the Bureau’s findings, the institutions “undertook a revision” of their consumer-facing materials and “undertook a plan to remediate consumers” who were charged an overdraft fee due to a paper check being negotiated before the consumer’s designated payment date.

Mortgage Servicing.  CFPB examiners found:

  • Servicers engaged in unfair practices by charging late fees greater than those permitted by the mortgage notes.  In one example, the FHA mortgage note permitted late fees based on a percentage of the overdue principal and interest only.  However, the servicer charged late fees based on a percentage of the full periodic payment of principal, interest, taxes, and insurance.  The overcharges were the result of programming errors in the servicing platform and “lapses in service provider oversight.”  In response to the findings, servicers conducted a review to identify and remediate affected borrowers and changed their policies and procedures “to assist in charging the late fee authorized by the mortgage note.”
  • Servicers engaged in deceptive practices by misrepresenting the conditions for the cancellation of private mortgage insurance (PMI).  One or more servicers were found to have told borrowers requesting PMI cancellation that such requests were declined because the borrowers has not reached the 80% loan to value requirement for cancellation.  While the relevant amortization schedules did not yet reach 80% LTV, the borrowers had in fact reached 80% LTV by making additional principal curtailment payments.  Although the borrowers had not satisfied additional conditions necessary for PMI cancellation, the servicers did not identify those conditions as the reasons for denying the borrowers’ cancellation requests.  In response to the Bureau’s findings, the servicers “changed templates, as well as policies and procedures, to ensure that PMI cancellation notices state accurate denial reasons.”
  • One or more servicers were found not to have satisfied the Regulation X requirement for a servicer to exercise “reasonable diligence” in obtaining documents and information to complete a loss mitigation application.  The servicers offered short-term payment forbearance programs during collection calls to delinquent borrowers who had expressed interest in loss mitigation and submitted financial information that the servicer would consider in evaluating them for loss mitigation.  However, the servicers had not notified the borrowers that their forbearance offers were based on an incomplete application evaluation and did not contact the borrowers, near the end of the forbearance period, to inquire whether they wanted to complete the applications to receive a full loss mitigation evaluation.  In response to the Bureau’s findings, the servicers “used enhanced processes, such as a centralized queue, to track borrowers receiving short-term forbearance programs and subsequently notify them that additional loss mitigation options may be available and that they could apply for such options over the phone or in writing.”
  • In examinations reviewing servicing of Home Equity Conversion Mortgage loans, examiners criticized the notices sent by servicers to successors of deceased borrowers informing them that they could qualify for an extension of time to delay or avoid foreclosure to enable them to purchase or market the property and directing them to return a form indicating their intentions for the property.  While the notices listed several documents that might be needed to evaluate whether the successor qualified for an extension, it did not direct them to submit such documents within a certain timeframe to be eligible for an extension. The Bureau found that the servicers had assessed foreclosure fees, and in some instances had foreclosed on properties, where successors had returned the form indicating that they intended to purchase or market the property but had not returned the documents necessary for an evaluation. While examiners did not find this to be a legal violation, they observed that it could pose a risk of a deceptive practice by creating an impression that the statement of intent was all that was needed to delay foreclosure.  In response to the Bureau’s findings, the servicers “planned to improve communications with successors, including specifying the documents successors needed for an extension and the relevant deadlines.”

Remittances.  CFPB examiners found that one or more supervised entities violated the remittance rule’s error resolution requirements by failing to refund fees and, as allowed by law, taxes to consumers whose remitted funds were made available to designated recipients later than the date of availability stated in the entity’s remittance disclosures and the delay was not due to any of the rule’s excepted events. The CFPB cited the violations, even though the delays at issue were due to a mistake by a non-agent foreign payer institution.  The CFPB reminded companies that “neither the relationship between a remittance transfer provider and the institution disbursing the funds to the designated recipient, nor the particular entity that is at fault for the delayed receipt of funds, is relevant to whether the remittance transfer provider must refund fees and taxes to the consumer.”  In response to the Bureau’s findings, the entities are making the mandated refunds.

Yesterday, the CFPB released the Winter 2019 edition of its Supervisory Highlights.  The report discusses the Bureau’s examination findings in the areas of automobile loan servicing, deposits, mortgage loan servicing, and remittances.  In this blog post, we focus on the Bureau’s findings relating to auto loan servicing.  (We will discuss the Bureau’s other findings in a separate blog post.)

The auto loan servicing findings include a discussion of interest to auto finance companies, based on the now-familiar topic of ancillary products.   Notably, however, the ancillary product issues identified concern refunds on such products when a consumer’s vehicle is repossessed or is declared a total loss.  These observations underline not only the Bureau’s continued interest in ancillary product issues, but also its high degree of attention to repossession- and collection-related issues in auto finance, which have been present in numerous examinations over the past couple of years.  The Bureau’s emphasis on ancillary product cancellation and refund issues also mirrors similar efforts by state regulators that we have observed.

The discussion in Supervisory Highlights mentions two practices that the Bureau found to be unfair or deceptive.  First, the Bureau stated that “one or more servicers” had made errors in requesting refunds on extended service contracts purchased with used cars.  In essence, the servicers allegedly had used the total mileage on the cars in calculating the refund amount, when the correct calculation should have been based on the miles driven by the consumer after purchase.  The Bureau noted that this error reduced the amount of the refunds provided to consumers, which in turn increased their deficiency balances.  According to the Bureau, the attempts made to collect these inflated balances were “unfair” under Dodd-Frank.  The servicer(s) involved remediated the issues (although the type of remediation is unspecified), and began to “verify mileage calculations” on service contract refunds.

Our take on this issue is that it reflects a pattern we continue to see in CFPB examinations – that errors in operations – be they human or system errors – are still a fertile ground for UDAAP findings by the CFPB.  And, as noted below, when those errors affect deficiency balances or collections, they Bureau will likely identify them as UDAAP violations.

The second issue discussed in Supervisory Highlights seems to be potentially more generally applicable.  The Bureau noted that “one or more servicers” failed altogether to request refunds on ancillary products after repossession or total loss events.  According to the CFPB, the servicers then sent deficiency balance notices to consumers, including a line item for “total credits/rebates.”  The Bureau concluded that this deceived consumers, who interpreted the statements as including any available refunds from ancillary products, when in fact no refunds had been requested by the servicer.  The Bureau went on to note that the servicer(s) involved “remediate[d] affected borrowers,” and “changed deficiency notices to clarify the status of eligible ancillary product rebates.”

On the one hand, this seems like a fairly obvious issue – auto finance companies should make an effort to request ancillary product refunds in the event of a total loss or repossession.  But there are two very strange things about the CFPB’s discussion of this issue that will tend to confuse, rather than assist, auto finance companies.  First, the Bureau notes this as purely a disclosure issue, arguing that the wording of the deficiency notices was misleading.  Second, the going-forward solution was for the deficiency balance disclosure to be changed to “clarify the status” of refunds on ancillary products.

That’s easy for auto finance companies to do, but industry players will undoubtedly be asking the question, “what is the extent of my duty to request ancillary product refunds in these situations?”  This is a significant operational question for auto finance companies, especially because many ancillary products are offered by dealers and administered by companies with which the finance company or bank has no relationship.  The CFPB’s discussion of this issue seems to suggest that there is no duty to request a refund, and indeed there is no indication that the entity involved was required to actually request refunds.  But we think that conclusion is probably a risky one to adopt, since we know that the Bureau (on other occasions) and state regulators have insisted that the finance company or bank does have such a duty.   But, since the Bureau’s discussion is confined solely to disclosure issues, we don’t know what the scope of that duty is.

We also note that although the discussion of this issue in Supervisory Highlights concerned repossessions and total loss situations, it can also arise in the context of early payoffs, when a consumer has purchased a GAP waiver product.  In our view, banks and auto finance companies should be equally sensitive to requesting refunds, calculating those refunds properly, and disclosing their status to consumers when an early payoff makes a GAP product no longer necessary for a consumer.

 

In this week’s podcast, Ballard Spahr partners Alan Kaplinsky and Chris Willis examine how the CFPB has changed under the leadership of Acting Director Mick Mulvaney and their expectations for future developments.

Alan and Chris discuss the practical impact of Mr. Mulvaney’s leadership on the CFPB’s day-to-day operations in the areas of supervision and enforcement, particularly with regard to how the CFPB’s public statements line up with its actual practices.  With regard to supervision and examinations, they highlight the Bureau’s current approach to UDAAP violations and military lending.

In the area of enforcement, Alan and Chris discuss the volume and nature of the Bureau’s current enforcement activity.  They also report on the status of the Bureau’s rulemaking initiatives and share their expectations for rulemaking under new leadership, including with regard to the Bureau’s payday lending rule and a debt collection rule.  They conclude the podcast by sharing their observations on the current compliance environment and its impact on decision-making by consumer financial services providers.

To listen and subscribe to the podcast, click here.

The CFPB’s newly-released Summer 2018 edition of Supervisory Highlights represents the CFPB’s first Supervisory Highlights report covering supervisory activities conducted under Acting Director Mick Mulvaney’s leadership.  The Bureau’s most recent prior Supervisory Highlights report was its Summer 2017 edition, which was issued in September 2017.

On October 10, 2018, from 12 p.m. to 1 p.m. ET, Ballard Spahr attorneys will hold a webinar, “Key Takeaways from the CFPB’s Summer 2018 Supervisory Highlights.”  The webinar registration form is available here.

Noticeably absent from the new report’s introduction and the Bureau’s press release about the report are statements touting the amount of restitution payments that resulted from supervisory resolutions or the amounts of consumer remediation or civil money penalties resulting from public enforcement actions connected to recent supervisory activities.  (The report does, however, include summaries of the terms of two consent orders entered into by the Bureau, including its settlement with Triton Management Group, Inc., a small-dollar lender, regarding the Bureau’s allegations that Triton had violated the Truth in Lending Act and the CFPA’s UDAAP prohibition by underdisclosing the finance charge on auto title pledges entered into with consumers.)

The report confirms that the Bureau’s supervisory activities have continued without significant change under its new leadership.  It includes the following information:

Automobile loan servicing.  The report indicates that in examinations of auto loan servicing activities, Bureau examiners focus primarily on whether servicers have engaged in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices prohibited by the CFPA.  It discusses instances observed by examiners in which servicers had sent billing statements to consumers who had experienced a total vehicle loss showing that the insurance proceeds had been applied to the loan so that the loan was paid ahead and the next payment was due months or years in the future.  The CFPB found the due dates in these statements to be inconsistent with the terms of the consumers’ notes which required the insurance proceeds to be applied to the loans as a one-time payment and any remaining balance to be collected according to the consumers’ regular payment schedules.  According to the CFPB, sending such statements was a deceptive practice.  The CFPB indicates that in response to the examination findings, servicers are sending billing statements that accurately reflect the account status after applying insurance proceeds.

The Bureau also found instances where servicers, due to incorrect account coding or the failure of their representatives to timely cancel the repossession, had repossessed vehicles after the repossession should have been cancelled because the consumer had entered into an extension agreement or made a payment.  This was found to be an unfair practice.  The CFPB indicates that in response to the examination findings, servicers are stopping the practice, reviewing the accounts of affected consumers, and removing or remediating all repossession-related fees.

Credit cards.  The report indicates that in examinations of the credit card account management operations of supervised entities, Bureau examiners typically assess advertising and marketing, account origination, account servicing, payments and periodic statements, dispute resolution, and the marketing, sale and servicing of add-on products.  The Bureau found instances where entities failed to properly re-evaluate credit card accounts for APR reductions in accordance with Regulation Z requirements where the APRs on the accounts had previously been increased. The report indicates that the issuers have undertaken, or developed plans to undertake, remedial and corrective actions in response to the examination findings.

Debt collection.  In examinations of larger participants, Bureau examiners found instances where debt collectors, before engaging in further collection activities as to consumers from whom they had received written debt validation disputes, had routinely failed to mail debt verifications to such consumers. The Bureau indicates that in response to the examination findings, the collectors are revising their debt validation procedures and practices to ensure that they obtain appropriate verifications when requested and mail them to consumers before engaging in further collection activities.

Mortgage servicing.  The report indicates that in examinations of servicers, Bureau examiners focus on the loss mitigation process and, in particular, on how servicers handle trial modifications where consumers are paying as agreed. In such examinations, the Bureau found unfair acts or practices relating to the conversion of trial modifications to permanent status and the initiation of foreclosures after consumers accepted loss mitigation offers.  In reviewing the practices of servicers with policies providing for permanent modifications of loans if consumers made four timely trial modification payments, the Bureau found that for nearly 300 consumers who successfully completed the trial modification, the servicers delayed processing the permanent modification for more than 30 days.  During these delays, consumers accrued interest and fees that would not have been accrued if the permanent modification had been processed.  The servicers did not remediate all of the affected consumers ,did not have policies or procedures for remediating consumers in such circumstances, and attributed the modification delays to insufficient staffing.  The Bureau indicates that in response to the examination findings, the servicers are fully remediating affected consumers and developing and implementing policies and procedures to timely convert trial modifications to permanent modifications where the consumers have met the trial modification conditions.

The Bureau also identified instances in which servicers, due to errors in their systems, had engaged in unfair acts or practices by charging consumers amounts not authorized by modification agreements or mortgage notes.  The Bureau indicates that in response to the examination findings, the servicers are remediating affected consumers (presumably by refunding or credit the unauthorized amounts) and correcting loan modification terms in their systems.

With regard to foreclosure practices, Bureau examiners found instances where mortgage servicers had approved borrowers for a loss mitigation option on a non-primary residence and, despite representing to borrowers that they would not initiate foreclosure if the borrower accepted loss mitigation offers in writing or by phone by a specified date, initiated foreclosures even if the borrowers had called or written to accept the loss mitigation offers by that date.  The Bureau identified this as a deceptive act or practice. The Bureau also found instances where borrowers who had submitted complete loss mitigation applications less than 37 days from a scheduled foreclosure sale date were sent a notice by their servicer indicating that their application was complete and stating that the servicer would notify the borrowers of their decision on the applications in writing within 30 days.  However, after sending these notices, the servicers conducted the scheduled foreclosure sales without making a decision on the borrowers’ loss mitigation application.  Interestingly, while the Bureau did not find that this conduct amounted to a “legal violation,” it did find that it could pose a risk of a deceptive practice.

Payday/title lending.  Bureau examiners identified instances of payday lenders engaging in deceptive acts or practices by representing in collection letters that “they will, or may have no choice but to, repossess consumers’ vehicles if the consumers fail to make payments or contact the entities.”  The CFPB observed that such representations were made “despite the fact that these entities did not have business relationships with any party to repossess vehicles and, as a general matter, did not repossess vehicles.”  The Bureau indicates that in response to the examination findings, these entities are ensuring that their collection letters do not contain deceptive content.  Bureau examiners also observed instances where lenders had used debit card numbers or Automated Clearing House (ACH) credentials that consumers had not validly authorized them to use to debit funds in connection with a defaulted single-payment or installment loan.  According to the Bureau, when lenders’ attempts to initiate electronic fund transfers (EFTs) using debit card numbers or ACH credentials that a borrower had identified on authorization forms executed in connection with the defaulted loan were unsuccessful, the lenders would then seek to collect the entire loan balance via EFTs using debit card numbers or ACH credentials that the borrower had supplied to the lenders for other purposes, such as when obtaining other loans or making one-time payments on other loans or the loan at issue.  The Bureau found this to be an unfair act or practice.  With regard to loans for which the consumer had entered into preauthorized EFTs to recur at substantially regular intervals, the Bureau found this conduct to also violate the Regulation E requirement that preauthorized EFTs from a consumer’s account be authorized by a writing signed or similarly authenticated by the consumer.  The Bureau indicates that in response to the examination findings, the lenders are ceasing the violations, remediating borrowers impacted by the invalid EFTs, and revising loan agreement templates and ACH authorization forms.

Small business lending. The Bureau states that in 2016 and 2017, it “began conducting supervision work to assess ECOA compliance in institutions’ small business lending product lines, focusing in particular on the risks of an ECOA violation in underwriting, pricing, and redlining.”  It also states that it “anticipates an ongoing dialogue with supervised institutions and other stakeholders as the Bureau moves forward with supervision work in small business lending.”  In the course of conducting ECOA small business lending reviews, Bureau examiners found instances where financial institutions had “effectively managed the risks of an ECOA violation in their small business lending programs,” with the examiners observing that “the board of directors and management maintained active oversight over the institutions’ compliance management system (CMS) framework.  Institutions developed and implemented comprehensive risk-focused policies and procedures for small business lending originations and actively addressed the risks of an ECOA violation by conducting periodic reviews of small business lending policies and procedures and by revising those policies and procedures as necessary.”  The Bureau adds that “[e]xaminations also observed that one or more institutions maintained a record of policy and procedure updates to ensure that they were kept current.”  With regard to self-monitoring, Bureau examiners found that institutions had “implemented small business lending monitoring programs and conducted semi-annual ECOA risk assessments that include assessments of small business lending.  In addition, one or more institutions actively monitored pricing-exception practices and volume through a committee.”  When the examinations included file reviews of manual underwriting overrides at one or more institutions, Bureau examiners “found that credit decisions made by the institutions were consistent with the requirements of ECOA, and thus the examinations did not find any violations of ECOA.”  The only negative findings made by Bureau examiners involved instances where institutions had collected and maintained (in useable form) only limited data on small business lending decisions.  The Bureau states that “[l]imited availability of data could impede an institution’s ability to monitor and test for the risks of ECOA violations through statistical analyses.”

Supervision program developments.  The report discusses the March 2018 mortgage servicing final rule and the May 2018 amendments to the TILA-RESPA integrated disclosure rule.  With regard to fair lending developments, it discusses recent HMDA-related developments and small business lending review procedures.  With regard to small business lending, the Bureau highlights that its reviews include a fair lending assessment of an institution’s compliance management system (CMS) related to small business lending and that CMS reviews include assessments of the institution’s board and management oversight, compliance program (policies and procedures, training, monitoring and/or audit, and complaint response), and service provider oversight.  The CFPB indicates that in some ECOA small business lending reviews, examiners may look at an institution’s fair lending risks and controls related to origination or pricing of small business lending products, including a geographic distribution analysis of small business loan applications, originations, loan officers, or marketing and outreach, in order to assess potential redlining risk.  It further indicates that such reviews may include statistical analysis of lending data in order to identify fair lending risks and appropriate areas of focus during the examination.  The Bureau states that “[n]otably, statistical analysis is only one factor taken into account by examination teams that review small business lending for ECOA compliance. Reviews typically include other methodologies to assess compliance, including policy and procedure reviews, interviews with management and staff, and reviews of individual loan files.”

In the CFPB’s RFI on its supervision program, one of the topics on which the CFPB sought comment is the usefulness of Supervisory Highlights to share findings and promote transparency.  The new report indicates that the Bureau “expects the publication of Supervisory Highlights will continue to aid Bureau-supervised entities in their efforts to comply with Federal consumer financial law.”  Presumably, this means that we will now again be seeing new editions of Supervisory Highlights on a regular basis.

 

On August 10, the New York Times reported that Mick Mulvaney, the CFPB Acting Director, intends to dispense with routine supervisory examinations of creditors for violations of the Military Lending Act (MLA).  According to the report, Acting Director Mulvaney has argued in a two-page draft change to the CFPB’s policies that “proactive oversight is not explicitly laid out in the legislation.”

We agree with Acting Director Mulvaney that the CFPB lacks statutory authority to examine creditors for MLA compliance.  Sections 1024(b)(1)(A) and 1025(b)(1)(A) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) provide that the CFPB shall conduct examinations of covered persons to assess compliance with the requirements of “Federal consumer financial laws.”  Section 1002(14) of the CFPA defines the term “Federal consumer financial law” to mean generally the provisions of the CFPA and the “enumerated consumer laws.”  Section 1002(12) lists the “enumerated consumer laws.”  There are 18 federal statutes listed in Section 1002(12).  Noticeably absent is the MLA.

Although supervisory examinations for MLA compliance are expected to come to a halt, the Times reports that the CFPB will continue to pursue cases against creditors for violations of the 36 percent interest rate cap.  (The 36% cap is on the Military Annual Percentage Rate (MAPR), which is an “all-in” APR that includes interest and other fees such as application fees and annual fees that are not finance charges under Regulation Z.)

While the CFPB does not have statutory authority to examine creditors for MLA compliance, it does have MLA enforcement authority.  The MLA authorizes the CFPB to enforce the MLA against the same persons as to whom it has Truth in Lending enforcement authority (i.e. any person subject to TILA.)

The CFPB will also continue to supervise creditors under other consumer protection statutes.  According to the Times report, “the rule change came from a top-to-bottom review of the bureau’s procedures geared at curtailing what the administration, along with lending industry executives, have criticized as overly aggressive enforcement by the bureau’s first director, Richard Cordray.”

In place of supervisory examinations, it appears the CFPB will rely exclusively on complaints reported by service members through the CFPB’s website and hotlines.  Christopher L. Peterson, a University of Utah law professor who participated in the drafting of the Department of Defense’s regulations implementing the MLA, observed that enforcement “will go from a proactive system to something that is completely reactive.”  At the same time, Acting Director Mulvaney is urging Congress to pass legislation amending the MLA to expressly permit supervisory examinations.  A spokesman for Mr. Mulvaney, John Czwartacki, stated “we are 100 precent committed to seeing that happens.”

 

CFPB Acting Director Mick Mulvaney reportedly announced on Thursday that he was lifting the freeze on the CFPB’s collection of personally identifiable information (PII) from companies it supervises.  As we previously reported in December 2017, Mr. Mulvaney imposed a freeze on the CFPB’s collection of PII due to concerns about the CFPB’s data security systems.

The freeze was reportedly lifted through a memo to the staff of the CFPB, in which Mr. Mulvaney stated that “Out of an abundance of caution and a desire to protect Americans’ privacy, I placed a hold on the collection of personally identifiable information and other sensitive data.”  However, “after an exhaustive review by outside experts, including a comprehensive ‘white-hat hacking’ effort, we can lift th[e] hold.”  The independent review concluded that “externally facing Bureau systems appear to be well-secured.”

The freeze had significantly impacted the CFPB’s supervisory program, prior to which companies being examined were able to submit information, including PII, to CFPB examiners by uploading it to the CFPB’s Extranet.  During the freeze, the CFPB halted use of the Extranet, and examination teams resorted to burdensome workarounds, such as requiring examination responses to be printed onto paper that could be shredded at the conclusion of the exam.  Notably, the freeze did not extend to the CFPB’s enforcement division, which continued to collect PII in connection with enforcement actions.

A group of Democratic Senators and House members have sent a letter to Mick Mulvaney and Leandra English expressing concern about Mr. Mulvaney’s announcement that he plans to reorganize the CFPB’s Office of Fair Lending (OFLEO).

Earlier this month, Mr. Mulvaney announced that he plans to transfer the OFLEO from the Supervision, Enforcement, and Fair Lending Division (SEFL) to the Director’s Office, where it will become part of the Office of Equal Opportunity and Fairness (OEOF).  At that time, Mr. Mulvaney stated that OFLEO “will continue to focus on advocacy, coordination, and education, while its current supervision and enforcement functions will remain in SEFL.”  The OEOF oversees equal employment, diversity, and inclusion at the CFPB, and has no enforcement or supervisory role.

In their letter, the Democratic lawmakers expressed concern that the reorganization will frustrate the CFPB’s efforts to protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination.  They cited OFLEO’s role in “help[ing] design specialized oversight and support[ing] bank examiners in assuring that CFPB’s regulated institutions were complying with anti-discrimination laws” and in “work[ing] with the CFPB’s enforcement lawyers and the Department of Justice to bring lawsuits” when problems identified in examinations could not be resolved. They noted that OFLEO has “also counseled banks in their efforts to build good compliance systems” and comment that of the OFLEO’s functions to date, “only the counseling will be supplied after the reorganization, though in the absence of dedicated anti-discrimination enforcement, it’s not clear whether there will be continuing demand.”

The Democratic lawmakers seek written responses to the questions asked in their letter by March 1, 2018 as well as “a copy of all documents and communications relating to the decision to [reorganize the OFLEO].”  Among the questions asked by the lawmakers are:

  • Whether the CFPB performed “a legal analysis to determine whether stripping the OFLEO of its enforcement authority would hinder the CFPB’s ability to carry out its statutory mandate to provide oversight and enforcement of federal fair lending laws
  • How transferring the OFLEO to the Director’s Office will “modify the Bureau’s decision-making process with regard to enforcement and other actions to protect consumers from unfair discrimination”
  • Whether Mr. Mulvaney or any other CFPB employee discussed the reorganization before it was announced “with any outside entities—including lobbyists or representatives of the banking or financial services industry”
  • Whether the CFPB is considering any substantive changes to its approach to the enforcement of fair lending laws, including changes to the CFPB’s interpretation of such laws

 

Yesterday, U.S. District Court Judge Timothy J. Kelly denied Leandra English’s motion for a preliminary injunction in a 46-page opinion. English had sought to block President Trump’s appointment of Mick Mulvaney to serve as the CFPB’s Acting Director. The Court denied that request and held that English failed to satisfy  any of the four elements of her preliminary injunction claim.

The Court found that English was unlikely to ultimately succeed on the merits of her claim. It held that the Vacancies Reform Act (“VRA”) gave President Trump the right to appoint a CFPB Acting Director and that the Dodd-Frank Act did not displace the President’s VRA authority. In reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on language in Dodd-Frank providing that all federal laws relating to federal employees or officers – such as the VRA – apply to the CFPB “except as otherwise provided expressly by law.” It found that Dodd-Frank’s reference to the Deputy Director’s service as the Acting Director in the Director’s “absence or unavailability” did not constitute an “express” provision of law overriding the VRA.

English had argued, under the canon of statutory construction that specific statutes trump general ones, that the Dodd-Frank provision was more specific than the VRA, and thus controlled. The Court soundly rejected this argument, finding that the VRA’s reference to “vacancies” was more specific to this situation than Dodd-Frank’s reference to the Director’s “absence or unavailability.”

The Court also rejected English’s argument that a different result was required because Dodd-Frank used the word “shall” in reference to the Deputy Director’s service as Acting Director. It relied on the commonsense notion that, while the word “shall” is generally mandatory, it is not necessarily unqualified. The court recognized that this very notion is embedded in Dodd-Frank itself. Dodd-Frank says that the Director “shall serve as the head of the [CFPB].” If “shall” were unqualified in that context, then the provision stating that the President “may” remove the Director for cause would be meaningless (and the statute nonsensical).

Further, relying on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Court rejected English’s position because it would create serious constitutional problems. “Under English’s reading, the CFPB Director has unchecked authority to decide who will inherit the potent regulatory and enforcement powers of that office, as well as the privilege of insulation from direct presidential control, in the event he resigns. Such authority appears to lack any precedent, even among other independent agencies.”

If the CFPB Director had that much control over his successor, it would severely diminish the President’s control over Executive officers and thus his constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” the Court held. It also acknowledged that a panel of the D.C. Circuit has already found that the CFPB’s structure is unconstitutional. It held that English’s reading of the statutes would only exacerbate those problems.

English had equal difficulty convincing the Court that she would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction were not issued. The only harm she proffered was the intangible harm she would suffer from being unable to perform the duties of the Acting Director. The Court declined to adopt the reasoning of the only authority supporting the proposition that such harm was irreparable harm — an unpublished district court decision from 1983 involving the termination of officers of an agency that would automatically cease to exist under its implementing statute thus precluding their later reinstatement. The Court found that English “utterly failed to describe any [irreparable] harm.”

On the third and final elements of English’s claim – balance of the equities and public interest – the Court found her claim equally wanting. English said that the need for clarity meant that an injunction should issue. The Court held that, “There is little question that there is a public interest in clarity here, but it is hard to see how granting English an injunction would bring any more of it. . . . The President has designated Mulvaney the CFPB’s acting Director, the CFPB has recognized him as the acting Director, and it is operating with him as the acting Director. Granting English an injunction . . . would only serve to muddy the waters.”

Finding that English failed to meet her burden on even one element of her preliminary injunction claim, the Court denied her motion. The Court’s decision does not ultimately resolve the merits of the case and English will doubtless file an appeal with the D.C. Circuit. Because of the cloud that the ongoing litigation casts on the legality of any of Mulvaney’s actions, President Trump should appoint a permanent Director without delay.

On December 12, the Credit Union National Association (“CUNA”) filed an amicus brief in D.C. Federal District Court opposing Leandra English’s motion for a preliminary injunction to block President Trump’s appointee for Acting CFPB Director, Mick Mulvaney, from exercising the powers of that office. The Court has already denied English’s motion for a temporary restraining order.

CUNA is the largest organization representing the nation’s 6,000 credit unions, which are heavily regulated by the CFPB. As such, it has a significant interest in the outcome of preliminary injunction hearing.

In its brief, CUNA argues that Mulvaney’s appointment was entirely proper under the Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (“VRA”). CUNA further argues that the language in Dodd-Frank stating that the Deputy Director shall become the Acting Director in the “absence or on availability” of the Director covers temporary situations, like an accident requiring long term hospitalization of the Director. It does not cover a vacancy in the office of the Director, including one resulting from a resignation.

Under the VRA, when an office is vacant, the President has the power to appoint an acting officer to fill the post, subject to certain limitations. Indeed, when the VRA was passed, the Senate committee that considered the VRA explicitly stated that, “statutes enacted in the future purporting to or argued to be construed to govern the temporary filling of offices covered by this statute are not to be effective unless they expressly provide that they are superseding the Vacancies Reform Act.” So, because Dodd-Frank did not explicitly override the VRA, the VRA governs.

In addition, CUNA points out the serious constitutional problems that would result if the court adopted English’s position. If she is right, then a departing CFPB Director would have the power to appoint anyone as his or her successor, including non-citizens, through the simple expedient of naming him or her as the Deputy Director, while the President would have more limited powers of appointment under the VRA. That would give the CFPB Director more power than the President over an agency in the executive branch of government.

What’s more, English’s argument also implies that the President would be as unable to remove an Acting CFPB Director as he is the CFPB Director. That only exacerbates the constitutional defects that are at the heart of the PHH case, which we have blogged about extensively.

CUNA’s brief, which Ballard Spahr authored, highlights the industry perspective on why Leandra English is wrong and why the court should not try to unwind the President’s appointment of an Acting CFPB Director. We will continue to follow this unfolding saga closely.

A group of Democratic House members led by Rep. Maxine Waters has introduced H.R. 3937, the “Megabank Accountability and Consequences Act of 2017,” that would require federal bank regulators to consider the revocation of a bank’s charter and deposit insurance if the bank is found to have engaged in a “pattern or practice” of violations of federal consumer protection laws.  The bank’s officers and directors would also be subject to civil and criminal liability.

The 45-page bill includes 10 pages of “findings.”  One such finding is that since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, “some very large banking organizations operating in the United States have repeatedly violated Federal banking and consumer protection laws by engaging in unethical business practices” and that such banks “continue to act with impunity and violate numerous laws designed to protect consumers” despite enforcement actions that have been taken “most notably” by the CFPB.

Other findings include:

  • Senior bank executives “rarely have been held personally accountable for Federal consumer protection law violations and other illicit practices that occurred during their tenure.”
  • Federal prudential banking agencies, despite their wide-ranging statutory powers to address violations, “continue to rely on enforcement tools such as consent orders, cease and desist orders, and civil money penalties, even in instances when an institution’s violations have demonstrated unsafe or unsound business practices and past supervisory and enforcement actions have not sufficiently deterred illegal practices.”
  • Institutions have continued to engage in inappropriate and illegal practices because the federal prudential banking agencies have failed to “exercise statutorily provided enforcement authorities—such as revoking a bank’s national charter or terminating its Federal deposit insurance” or “hold the institution’s board of directors and senior officers accountable.”
  • Even if a bank’s violations of federal consumer financial laws “are deemed not to technically constitute unsafe or unsound banking practices, it may still demonstrate a pattern of wrongdoing causing unacceptable harm to its customers, such that continuing to enable it to engage in the business of banking distorts the regulatory purpose of providing national banks charters, deposit insurance and other benefits.”

The bill’s provisions would apply to a national bank, federal savings association, state Federal Reserve member bank, insured depository institution, foreign bank, or federal branch or agency of a foreign bank if such entity is “affiliated with a global systematically important bank holding company.”  A “global systematically important bank holding company” is defined as a bank holding company that the Fed has identified as a “global systematically important bank holding company” or a “global systematically important foreign banking organization” pursuant to existing federal regulations.

The bill contains a definition of “pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices or other violations related to consumer banking” that lists 7 types of activities and provides that a bank satisfies the “pattern or practice” definition if it engages in all of such activities “to the extent each activity was discovered or occurred at least once in the 10 years preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.”  It also contains a definition of “pattern or practice of violations of federal consumer protection laws.”

The bill includes the following requirements and sanctions:

  • If the OCC, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that a bank “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the OCC must “immediately initiate proceedings to terminate the [bank’s] Federal charter…or appoint a receiver for [the bank].”
  • If the FDIC, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that an insured depository institution “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the FDIC must “immediately initiate an involuntary termination of the [bank’s] deposit insurance.”
  • If the Fed, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that a state member bank “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the Fed must “immediately initiate proceedings to terminate such bank’s membership in the Federal Reserve System.”
  • If the Fed, after consultation with the CFPB, determines that a foreign bank or federal branch or agency of a foreign bank “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm,” the Fed must “immediately initiate proceedings to terminate the foreign bank’s ability to operate in the United States” or recommend to the OCC that the branch’s or agency’s license be terminated.
  • If the OCC, Fed, or FDIC makes a determination to initiate proceedings to terminate a bank’s charter or deposit insurance, the agency must notify the bank “that removal is required of any director or senior officers responsible, as determined by [that agency], for overseeing any division of the [bank] during the time the [bank] was engaging in the identified pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices.”  Any current or former director or senior officer determined to have such responsibility “shall also be permanently banned from working as an employee, officer, or director of any other banking organization.”
  • If the FDIC determines that an insured depository institution “is engaging or has engaged in a pattern or practice of unsafe or unsound banking practices and other violations related to consumer harm” or is notified by the OCC or Fed of the termination of a bank’s charter or an agency’s or branch’s license, the FDIC must not only initiate an involuntary termination of deposit insurance, it also must place the institution into receivership and can transfer the institution’s assets as provided in the bill.
  • Every “executive officer and director” of a national bank or federal savings association or a branch, representative office, or agency of a federally-licensed foreign bank must annually certify in writing to the appropriate banking agency, the CFPB, and any relevant federal law enforcement agency, that he or she has “regularly reviewed the institution’s lines of business and conducted due diligence to ensure,” that the institution (1) has established and maintained internal risk controls to identify significant federal law consumer compliance deficiencies and weaknesses, (2) has promptly disclosed all known violations of applicable federal consumer protection laws to the CFPB and appropriate banking agency, (3) is taking all reasonable steps to correct any identified federal law consumer compliance deficiencies and weakness based on prior examinations, and (4) is in substantial compliance with all federal consumer protection laws.
  • An officer or director who submits a certification that contains a false statement is subject to a fine or imprisonment if the statement is “done knowingly” or “done intentionally.”
  • An officer or director who knowingly violates any federal consumer protection law or directs any of the institution’s agents, officers, or directors to violate such a law is personally liable for any damages sustained by the institution or any other person as a result of the violation.  An officer or director who knowingly causes an institution to violate any federal consumer protection law or directs any of the institution’s agents, officers, or directors to commit a violation that results in the director or officer “being personally unjustly enriched and the institution being conducted in an unsafe and unsound manner” can be fined in an amount up to all of the compensation he or she received during the period in which the violations occurred or in the one to three years preceding discovery of the violations, and is subject to up to 5 years imprisonment.  The OCC, Fed, or FDIC, as applicable, must remove an officer or director who engaged in the foregoing conduct from his or her position and permanently ban such person from being involved in the operation and management of a federally-chartered or federally-insured bank.

Were it to become law, the bill’s certification requirement would likely make it very difficult for banks to attract and retain highly-qualified officers and directors.  It could also lead to instability in the banking system by creating a  “run” on deposits by depositors of a bank that became subject to the bill’s sanctions, particularly those whose deposits at the bank exceeded the insured deposit limit.

Fortunately, given the large Republican majority in the House, the bill is very unlikely to advance.