Summary

On October 1, 2026, Assistant Attorney General Colin M. McDonald of the Department of Justice (DOJ) National Fraud Enforcement Division issued Directive 26-12 on corporate enforcement. The directive identifies four priority areas and instructs prosecutors to give “great weight” to a non-exhaustive list of factors in determining whether to bring charges and in negotiating plea or other agreements. It also directs prosecutors to follow and implement the Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) and describes the role of the Corporate Enforcement Section.

The Upshot

Though the directive is consistent with current DOJ policy, several provisions merit attention:

  • Within seven days of the directive’s issuance, Fraud Division prosecutors must report any ongoing corporate investigations to the Chief of the Corporate Enforcement Section. The Section must also be promptly notified of new corporate investigations and significant developments in ongoing corporate cases, and has primary responsibility for evaluating compliance with corporate criminal resolutions.
  • Priority areas include health care fraud, including distribution of controlled substances and violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; fraud schemes involving public trust or financial integrity related to procurement, government contracts, and other government functions; significant evasion of internal or external revenue; and fraud schemes involving tariff evasion, importation of goods or services, or forced labor.
  • Prosecutors must place “great weight” on a non-exhaustive list of factors when determining whether to bring charges and in negotiating plea or other agreements, including management knowledge or involvement, concealment or obstruction, duration, threats to safety or security, impact on taxpayer-funded programs or government functions, geographic scope, victim or loss thresholds, exfiltration of American dollars to support foreign adversaries, and immigration offenses.
  • The directive instructs Division leadership to design and implement policies and programs to incentivize whistleblowers to bring forward credible information about fraud, including whistleblowers who participated in the criminal conduct. 

The Bottom Line

The directive does not materially alter the DOJ’s approach to corporate and white collar enforcement. It does, however, underscore a focus on fraud in which the government is the victim, framing the Division’s mission around fraud “against the United States and American taxpayer dollars.” Schemes in which companies themselves are the victims–such as trade secrets or embezzlement–are not excluded, but they are not among the directive’s enumerated priorities. The central role of a dedicated Corporate Enforcement Section within a well-resourced Fraud Division confirms that corporate fraud remains an administration priority, and enforcement activity is likely to increase. Companies operating in the priority sectors should anticipate heightened scrutiny and be prepared to review their compliance programs and procedures for assessing potential misconduct, disclosure, cooperation, and remediation, with the advice of counsel.