On September 20, 2017, the Federal Reserve’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) issued a report on the CFPB’s process for issuing Civil Investigative Demands (“CID”). The OIG found that the CFPB “generally complied” with requirements for issuing CIDs, with two exceptions. First, the CFPB failed to use notifications of purpose that adequately informed recipients about the nature of the investigation. Second, the CFPB failed to keep complete organized records of challenges to CIDs.

First, the OIG found that the CFPB’s internal policy manual encouraged investigators to “describe the nature of the conduct and the potentially applicable law in very broad terms.” Investigators apparently told the OIG that the notifications of purpose must be “necessarily broad.” This, they said, is to allow the investigation to “develop over time.” The OIG found that such notifications of purpose might “increase the risk that the language in the CID’s [] notification of purpose does not comply with [] case law.” Such notifications “may [also] limit the recipient’s ability to understand the basis for requests and thereby heighten the risk that the CID may face a legal challenge. . . .” These findings are not new. As we mentioned earlier this year, the D.C. Circuit recently affirmed a lower court’s determination that a CID was invalid because the notification of purpose was impermissibly vague. The OIG noted that the CFPB took steps to correct this deficiency. It found that those steps effectively cured the problem.

Second, the OIG found that the CFPB could do a better job at records management. It found that the CFPB maintained only decentralized records of CID challenges and lacked a centralized record-keeping system. In reaching this conclusion, the OIG noted that “The lack of a centralized record of all petitions and supporting documents may have contributed to the Office of the Executive Secretariat’s delay in responding to our request for the number of petitions filed to date.” The decentralized record-keeping issue is relevant to the public and the industry because the CFPB posts CID challenges on its website. The OIG noted that the CFPB took steps to centralize its record-keeping. It indicated, however, that further follow-up was needed to verify that the new system addressed the issue.

On September 5, 2017, the CFPB entered into a consent order with Zero Parallel, LLC (“Zero Parallel”), an online lead aggregator based in Glendale, California. At the same time, it submitted a proposed order in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, where it is litigating with Zero Parallel’s CEO, Davit Gasparyan. Zero Parallel and Gasparyan agreed to pay a total of $350,000 in civil money penalties to settle claims brought by the CFPB.

In the two actions, the CFPB claimed that Zero Parallel, with Gasparyan’s substantial assistance, helped provide loans to consumers which would be void under the laws of the states in which the consumers lived. Zero Parallel allegedly facilitated the loans by acting as a lead aggregator. In that role, Zero Parallel collected information that consumers entered into various websites indicating that they were interested in taking out payday or installment loans. Zero Parallel then transmitted consumers’ information to various online lenders which evaluated the consumers’ information. The lenders then decided whether they wished to make the loans. If they did, the lenders purchased the leads from Zero Parallel and interacted directly with consumers to complete the loan transactions. (More on the lead generation process in our previous blog postings.)

In some cases, the lenders who purchased the leads offered loans on terms that were prohibited in the states where the consumers resided. The CFPB claims that such loans were therefore void. Because Zero Parallel allegedly knew that the leads it sold were likely to result in void loans, the CFPB alleged that Zero Parallel engaged in abusive acts and practices. Under the consent order, and the proposed order, if it is entered, Zero Parallel will be prohibited from selling leads that would facilitate such loans. To prevent this from happening, the orders require Zero Parallel to take reasonable steps to filter the leads it receives so as to steer consumers away from these allegedly void loans.

The CFPB also faulted Zero Parallel for failing to ensure that consumers were adequately informed about the lead generation process. This allegedly caused consumers to get bad deals on the loans they took out.

Consistent with our earlier blog posts about regulatory interest in lead generation, we see two takeaways from the Zero Parallel case.  First, the CFPB remains willing to hold service providers liable for the alleged bad acts of financial services companies to which they provide services. This requires service providers to engage in “reverse vendor oversight” to protect themselves from claims like the ones the CFPB made here.  Second, the issue of disclosure on websites used to generate leads remains a topic of heightened regulatory interest. Financial institutions and lead generators alike should remain focused such disclosures.

As we’ve discussed before, the CFPB sued Navient over its student loan servicing practices in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  In doing so, the CFPB followed its strategy of announcing new legal standards by enforcement action and then applying them retroactively. The chief allegation in the complaint is that Navient wrongly “steered” consumers into using loan forbearance rather than income-based repayment plans to cure or avoid defaults on their student loans.

On March 24, 2017, Navient moved to dismiss the complaint on a number of grounds.  Although the district court, in a decision issued on August 4, declined to dismiss the case, the motion raised several arguments that a court of appeals should not be so quick to gloss over.  We focus here on two of them: fair notice and the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure.

Fair Notice

Navient argued in its briefs that the CFPB was pursuing them for alleged conduct when Navient was not given fair notice that the conduct, if it occurred, violated the law.  The court used a technicality to decline to consider Navient’s fair notice argument at all.  The court stated that: “[Under the relevant authorities,] Navient’s fair notice argument fails if it was reasonably foreseeable to Navient that a court could construe their alleged conduct as unfair, deceptive, or abusive under the CFP Act.  Navient, however, has only advanced arguments as to why it did not have fair notice of the Bureau’s interpretation of the CFP Act (emphasis added).”  Thus, the court found that it need not consider the fair notice argument.

In doing so, the court ignored authorities Navient cited that held that, as Navient paraphrased, “[a]n agency cannot base an enforcement action on law created or changed after the conduct occurred.”  The court also ignored the obvious and clearly-implied corollary to Navient’s argument: the only way for Navient to be liable for the claims alleged in the complaint would be for a court, namely, the Middle District of Pennsylvania, to adopt the Bureau’s position.  Thus, with all due respect for the court, Navient’s fair notice argument was fairly before it and should not have been so lightly cast aside.

This is especially so given how well-founded the argument seems to have been.  How could Navient have known that the CFP Act required it to provide over-the-phone individualized financial counseling to borrowers as a result of a statement on its website indicating that “Our representatives can help you by identifying options and solutions, so you can make the right decision for your situation (emphasis added).”  The statement was both conditional, and placed the duty for making the right decision squarely on consumers. The court completely ignored the fact that the CFP Act’s prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive conduct would not have alerted anyone that the CFPB or a court would make the inferential leap between that statement and the duty that the CFPB says Navient undertook by making it.

Constitutionality of CFPB Structure

The court also rejected the argument that the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional.  We’ve discussed before why we believe that such a view is incorrect and even dangerous to our constitution.  But a few of those arguments bear repeating in light of the Navient court’s ruling.  The first problem with the Navient court’s holding is that it applies Humphrey’s Executor in a way that ignores the fundamental holding of the case.  In Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court held that for-cause removal, staggered terms, and a combination of enforcement and law-making powers was acceptable in a multi-member commission.  Its rationale: because of the commission structure, the FTC would operate as a quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial body, not a quasi-executive one.  Not to state the obvious, but the CFPB is not a multi-member commission; its unitary director is like the President, a unitary executive.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s indulgence of these accountability-limiting features in Humphrey’s Executor does not apply to the CFPB.

Second, the retort to this argument, that the CFPB Director is somehow more accountable to the President, is a legal fiction at best. If the President has no power to remove the Director without cause, the Director is not accountable to him. Period. The President can approach the Director, ask him to implement a certain policy, and the Director can ignore the President with impunity. That is not accountability, however one may measure it. It is true that the five FTC Commissioners, the entire board of the Federal Reserve, or the SEC Commissioners could do the same. But, those interactions are more like the ones the President faces in dealing with Congress or the Judiciary, interactions that the Constitution contemplated and intended. With the CFPB Director, the President stands powerless before the unitary executive of a federal agency whose will can stand in direct contrast to his own. If that is not an affront to the Constitution’s notion of the President as a unitary executive, what is?

Third, the Supreme Court also indulged accountability-limiting features in Morrison v. Olsen, because, among other reasons, the inferior officer at issue in the case “lack[ed] policymaking or significant administrative authority.” Such is not the case with the CFPB Director.  The Director is not an inferior officer. More importantly, he has substantial policymaking authority.  The Director has the authority to approve and enforce regulations relating to any consumer financial product or service, companies and individuals involved in providing such services, and service-providers to those companies and individuals.  The CFPB has interpreted its authority to extend not just to banks, lenders, and debt collectors, but to mobile phone companies, homebuilders, payment processors, and law firms. The court in this case ignored these substantial differences between the CFPB Director and the inferior officer approved in Morrison v. Olsen.

Finally, the court ignored the implications of its ruling.  Before long, if the CFPB structure is replicated elsewhere in government, we’ll have a government where Congress, the President, and even the courts are relegated to the sidelines while powerful bureaucrats make law, interpret the law, and enforce it with virtually no political oversight.

* * *

As the case progresses, Navient will continue to defend itself. We will keep a close eye on the case and, as always, keep you posted.

On July 21, 2017, an investment adviser sought review by the Supreme Court of the D.C. Circuit’s recent ruling in Lucia that allowed to stand a district court decision holding that SEC administrative law judges (“ALJs”) are not officers subject to the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution. We’ve blogged about Lucia extensively because the issue in that case has the potential to impact the outcome of the PHH case.

The initial PHH decision was decided by an SEC ALJ who was on loan to the CFPB. If the Supreme Court decides to hear Lucia and decides that SEC ALJs are subject to the appointments clause, then the initial ALJ decision in PHH may be invalidated. If that happens, the D.C. Circuit could remand PHH back to the CFPB for decision by a properly-appointed ALJ. That would provide the D.C. Circuit with another basis to decide the PHH case without addressing the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure. Given how the PHH oral arguments went, that seems unlikely, but we will continue to follow Lucia just in case.

Effective July 18, 2017, the FDIC has adopted amendments to its Guidelines for Appeals of Material Supervisory Determinations.  The FDIC proposed the amendments last August and received only two comment letters, one from a trade association and the other from a financial holding company.

The amendments are intended to provide institutions with broader avenues of redress with respect to material supervisory determinations and enhance consistency with the appeals process of other federal banking agencies.  The term “material supervisory determinations” is defined by the Reigle Act to include determinations relating to (1) examination ratings; (2) the adequacy of loan loss reserve provisions; and (3) classifications of loans that are significant to an institution.  The Guidelines list the types of determinations that constitute “material supervisory determinations.”   Under the Guidelines, an institution may not file an appeal to the Supervision Appeals Review Committee (SARC) unless it has first filed a timely request for review of a material supervisory determination with the Division Director.

The amendments expand the definition of “material supervisory determination” by allowing determinations regarding an institution’s level of compliance with a formal enforcement action to be appealed as a material supervisory determination.  However, if the FDIC determines that lack of compliance with an existing enforcement action requires further enforcement action, the proposed new enforcement action would not be appealable.  Matters requiring board attention are also added to the list of appealable material supervisory determinations.

The amendments remove decisions to initiate informal enforcement action (such as a Memorandum of Understanding) from the list of determinations that are not appealable and add such decisions to the list of appealable material supervisory determinations.

Other amendments include the following:

  • A clarification that a formal enforcement-related action would commence and become unappealable when the FDIC initiates a formal investigation under 12 U.S.C section 1820(c) or provides written notice to the institution of a recommended or proposed formal enforcement action under applicable statutes or published enforcement-related FDIC policies, including written notice of a referral to the Attorney General pursuant to the ECOA or a notice to HUD for ECOA or FHA violations.
  • An amendment providing that when an institution has filed an appeal of a material supervisory determination through the SARC process, the appeal will not be affected if the FDIC subsequently initiates a formal enforcement-related action or decision based on the same facts and circumstances as the appeal.
  • An amendment providing for the publication of annual reports on Division Directors’ decisions with respect to requests by institutions for review of material supervisory determinations.
  • An amendment providing that the current standard for review for SARC appeals also applies to Division-level reviews.

 

 

Based on a Law360 article reporting on an interview with Thomas Pahl, the Acting Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, it appears that under its new leadership, the FTC will take a less aggressive approach to enforcement than the agency had taken under the Obama Administration.  Mr. Pahl was appointed Acting Director by Maureen Ohlhausen, who President Trump named Acting Chairman of the FTC.

While Mr. Pahl stated that privacy enforcement will continue to be an FTC priority, he indicated that the FTC will not follow the Obama Administration’s approach of labeling certain privacy and data security practices unfair or deceptive in the absence of clear consumer harm.  According to Mr. Pahl, the FTC’s enforcement activity will target practices where there is concrete, tangible evidence of consumer injury.

With regard to national advertising, Mr. Pahl indicated that the FTC’s enforcement activity will focus on fraud and quasi-fraud and will prioritize matters involving advertising and marketing directed at certain populations such as the military, the elderly, and consumers living in rural areas.  He also indicated that in deciding whether to recommend an enforcement action, FTC staff will look at consumer injury and the costs and benefits of a practice.

With regard to financial practices, Mr. Pahl indicated that the FTC’s enforcement activity will target matters involving fraud or quasi-fraud in areas such as debt collection and payday lending, with priority given to matters that are outside of the CFPB’s jurisdiction.  Such matters include claims against auto dealers, claims under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, and claims against companies belonging to industries for which the CFPB has created a “larger participant” rule, such as debt collectors, but that do not qualify as a “larger participant.”  Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB has authority to supervise, regardless of size, providers of residential mortgage loans and certain related services, payday loans, and private education loans.  Dodd-Frank also gave the CFPB supervisory authority over providers considered to be “a larger participant of a market for other consumer financial products or services.”

Once CFPB Director Cordray departs and is replaced by a successor appointed by President Trump, we would hope and expect that he or she will narrow the CFPB’s enforcement priorities in a manner similar to what Mr. Pahl has described for the FTC.

 

On July 17th, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced reforms to its civil investigative demand (CID) process designed to streamline information requests and improve transparency in FTC investigations.  The process reforms that will be implemented for consumer protection cases include:

  • Providing plain language descriptions of the CID process and developing business education materials to help small businesses understand how to comply;
  • Adding more detailed descriptions of the scope and purpose of investigations to give companies a better understanding of the information the agency seeks;
  • Where appropriate, limiting the relevant time periods to minimize undue burden on companies;
  • Where appropriate, significantly reducing the length and complexity of CID instructions for providing electronically stored data;
  • Where appropriate, increasing response times for CIDs (for example, often 21 days to 30 days for targets, and 14 days to 21 days for third parties) to improve the quality and timeliness of compliance by recipient; and
  • Ensuring companies are aware of the status of investigations by adhering to the current practice of communicating with investigation targets concerning the status of investigations at least every six months after they comply with the CID.

The reforms are part of the FTC’s broader initiative to implement Presidential directives aimed at eliminating wasteful, unnecessary regulations, and processes.  The FTC had previously announced other efforts that are already underway:

  • Forming new groups within the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection working to eliminate unnecessary costs to companies and individuals who receive CIDs.
  • Reviewing FTC dockets and closing older investigations, where appropriate.
  • Working to identify unnecessary regulations that are no longer in the public interest.
  • The FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection is actively reviewing closed data security investigations to extract key lessons for improved guidance and transparency.
  • The FTC Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Economics are working together to integrate economic expertise earlier in FTC investigations to better inform agency decisions about the consumer welfare effects of enforcement actions.
  • Acting Chairman Ohlhausen has established a new capability within her office to collect and review ideas on process streamlining and operational efficiency opportunities from across the agency.

The CFPB, which originally modeled many of its own investigatory processes on the FTC model, should consider whether any of these reforms make sense for its own CIDs, which have been frequently criticized as being expansive in scope, vague, and unduly burdensome.

On June 26, 2017, the en banc D.C. Circuit was equally divided on the question of whether SEC administrative law judges (“ALJs”) are “inferior officers.”  This leaves intact the D.C. Circuit panel decision in Lucia which held that SEC ALJs are not officers and do not have to be appointed by the President.  Because SEC ALJs are not appointed that way, a different decision may have called into question virtually every SEC ALJ decision ever issued.

Because it was an SEC ALJ who rendered the initial PHH decision, there was talk that a different decision in Lucia may have given the en banc D.C. Circuit a way to decide the PHH case in PHH’s favor without addressing the constitutional issues surrounding the CFPB’s structure.  Indeed, in its final merits brief at the panel level, PHH raised the same argument at issue in Lucia.  While the panel decision in PHH did not address the issue, in his concurrence, Judge Randolph stated that the problem with the ALJ’s appointment “itself rendered the proceedings against petitioners unconstitutional.”  It may be that the Lucia issue ends up being decided in the PHH case, which has an eleven-judge panel that cannot split evenly.

A group of Democratic Senators have introduced a bill, the “Military Consumer Protection Act” (S. 1565), that would amend the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) to include various sections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) within the list of laws defined by the CFPA as “enumerated consumer laws.”

The “enumerated consumer laws” are included within the CFPA’s definition of “Federal consumer financial laws.”  Section 1054 authorizes the CFPB to bring a civil action against a person who violates a “Federal consumer financial law.”  As a result, the bill would appear to give the CFPB direct SCRA enforcement authority.  While the CFPB currently examines supervised entities for SCRA compliance, it refers SCRA matters to the DOJ for enforcement.

The bill would appear to give the CFPB authority to enforce the following SCRA sections:

  • Section 107. Waiver of rights pursuant to written agreement (except with respect to bailments)
  • Section 108. Exercise of rights under the SCRA not to affect certain future financial transactions (except with respect to insurance)
  • Section 201. Protection of servicemembers against default judgments, which excludes child custody proceedings
  • Section 207. Maximum rate of interest on debts incurred before military service
  • Section 301. Evictions and distress
  • Section 302. Protection under installment contracts for purchase or lease
  • Section 303. Mortgages and trust deeds
  • Section 305. Termination of residential or motor vehicle leases
  • Section 305A. Termination of telephone service contracts

 

 

 

 

The Federal Trade Commission has provided its annual Financial Acts Enforcement Report to the CFPB covering the FTC’s enforcement activities in 2016 relating to compliance with Regulation Z (Truth in Lending Act), Regulation M (Consumer Leasing Act), and Regulation E (Electronic Fund Transfer Act).  Under Dodd-Frank, the FTC retained its authority to enforce these regulations with respect to entities subject to its jurisdiction.  The FTC and CFPB coordinate their enforcement and related activities pursuant to a MOU entered into in 2012 and reauthorized in 2015.  The Report responds to the CFPB’s request for information regarding the FTC’s efforts, which focused on three areas: enforcement actions; rulemaking, research, and policy development; and consumer and business education.

Regulation Z/TILA.  The FTC’s TILA enforcement activities included: (1) initiating two actions in federal district court for civil penalties involving alleged deceptive advertising by auto dealers, one of which focused on dealer advertising aimed at non-English speaking consumers; (2) winning a $1.3 billion dollar judgment against a group of payday lenders in Kansas City for alleged deceptive lending practices, including failing to truthfully disclose loan terms; (3) obtaining a $13.4 million judgment for contempt against a consumer electronics retailer for violations of a prior consent order, which arose from failures to provide required written disclosures and account statements; and (4) continuing to litigate two federal cases involving alleged forensic audit scams by mortgage assistance relief services that offered, among other things, to review or audit mortgage documents to identify violations of the TILA, Regulation Z, and other federal laws, and obtaining in both cases monetary judgments against multiple defendants.

In the first of the federal court actions involving alleged deceptive advertising by auto dealers, the FTC sued three auto dealers who it alleged concealed sale and lease terms that added significant costs or limited who could qualify for advertised prices.  Such alleged concealment included using print too small to read without magnification to disclose that, in addition to a low monthly price, the consumer would be required to pay a down payment and fees up front and pay a large amount at the end of the financing term.  The dealers were alleged to have violated the TILA by advertising credit terms without clearly and conspicuously disclosing required information and by failing to keep and produce required records.

In the second of such federal court actions, the FTC sued nine dealerships and owners who it alleged had enticed consumers, particularly financially distressed and non-English speaking consumers, with advertisements that made misleading claims about the availability of vehicles for advertised prices and financing terms.  The group was alleged to have violated TILA and Regulation Z by not clearly disclosing required credit information in advertisements.

The FTC reported that its TILA rulemaking, research and policy efforts continued through 2016.  Though the FTC does not have rulemaking authority under the TILA, it nonetheless engages in research related to the TILA.  The FTC’s research initiatives included: (1) proposing a qualitative survey of consumer experiences in buying and financing automobiles at dealerships; (2) beginning a forum series exploring emerging financial technologies, where the inaugural forum addressed marketplace lending; (3) holding a workshop on improving the effectiveness of consumer disclosures related to advertising claims and privacy policies; (4) hosting a conference focused on TILA and other compliance issues facing Midwest consumers, and in particular payday loans and car title loans; and (5) participating in the interagency group that provides advice to the Department of Defense on Military Lending Act regulations.

TILA consumer and business education efforts by the FTC included: (1) providing online guidance to the military community about personal financial decisions and military consumer lending issues; (2) issuing blog posts and videos for consumers regarding automobile purchasing and financing; and (3) issuing guidance on deceptive payday lending practices, marketplace lending issues, and disclosures.

Regulation M/Consumer Leasing Act.  The FTC’s Regulation M enforcement efforts included one final administrative consent order involving auto dealers alleged to have deceived consumers and the filing of the two federal court actions discussed above.  In the consent order, the auto dealers, Southwest Kia and Sage Auto, were alleged to have advertised low monthly car lease payments and down payments, without disclosing other key terms and, in violation of the CLA, failed to disclose or clearly and conspicuously disclose lease terms.  In the Southwest Kia action, the dealers were alleged to have violated the CLA by advertising lease terms without clearly and conspicuously disclosing required information—for instance, a television advertisement offered vehicles for less than $200 a month and disclosed in fine print visible for two seconds that the offer only applied to leases and required a $1,999 payment at signing.  The Sage Auto defendants allegedly violated the CLA by failing to clearly and conspicuously disclose lease terms.  As an example, the defendants ran newspaper advertisements offering vehicles for $38 a month and $38 down, but the fine print below the ad listed additional charges of $2,695 at signing, limited the offer to leases, and limited the $38 payment to the first six months.

The CLA does not confer rulemaking authority on the FTC.  Nonetheless, the FTC hosted a workshop to examine consumer leasing of rooftop solar panels.  The FTC also worked with the ABA committee on consumer leasing issues.  FTC blog posts also addressed consumer leasing.

Regulation E/EFTA. The FTC’s Regulation E enforcement actions included six new or ongoing cases.  Four cases involved negative options and the payment terms that applied automatically absent cancellation.

In the first, the defendants allegedly obtained consumers’ credit or debit card information purportedly to pay shipping costs but imposed recurring monthly charges to their credit or debit card accounts for unordered products.  This case resulted in a $72.7 million monetary judgment suspended upon the defendants’ surrender of virtually all assets.

In the second case, customers were allegedly enticed to sign up for “free” or “risk free” trials but their bank accounts were electronically charged recurring monthly fees without authorization.  The second case resulted in an agreed-upon $280.9 million judgment against some defendants, though others continue to litigate.

The third case involved the alleged use of personal information to sign up for a “free trial” or discount program for weight-loss supplements, where customers’ bank accounts were then charged electronically on a recurring basis.  The defendants also allegedly failed to allow consumers to stop the charges.  The third case led to a $105 million judgment, again suspended after surrender of over $9 million in personal and business assets.

The fourth case also involved weight loss supplements.  Here, the FTC alleged consumers were promised a “risk-free trial” offer, and were then enrolled in an inadequately disclosed monthly plan resulting in additional charges to their credit card or debit card accounts.  Consumers who failed to cancel trial memberships were allegedly billed on a monthly basis.  The fourth action was filed along with a stipulated final order imposing a $16.4 million judgment, suspended after the sale and liquidation of personal and business assets.

The FTC’s two other EFTA-related cases were the payday lending case and consumer electronics retail cases discussed above.  In the payday lending case, the defendants allegedly violated the EFTA by conditioning payday loans on payment by preauthorized debits from bank accounts.  In the consumer electronics retail case, the FTC alleged an EFTA violation where the extension of credit was conditioned on mandatory preauthorized transfers.

As with the TILA and the CLA, the FTC lacks rulemaking authority under the EFTA, although it conducts research and policy work that touches on related issues.  In that regard, the FTC worked with the Department of Defense interagency group and ABA on electronic fund transfer issues, interpretive rules, and trainings.  The FTC also hosted various conferences addressing EFTA issues and other compliance issues in connection with marketplace lending, crowdfunding and peer-to-peer payments.

The FTC continued its consumer and business education efforts with blog posts providing guidance on negative option plans and recent cases, explaining possible EFTA and Regulation E violations, giving advice to consumers, and providing guidance to businesses on EFTA issues.