We look at the impact of federal and state law including relevant CARES Act provisions, state garnishment directives, and federal preemption, identify issues banks should consider in handling garnishments or exercising setoff rights, and offer suggestions for mitigation measures banks can take as they decide how to address the challenges in this area.

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As previously reported, at the end of April 2020, the CFPB issued two factsheets regarding the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Regulation B provisions that require creditors to provide the applicant with a copy of any written appraisal or other valuation developed in connection with an application for a first lien mortgage loan to be secured by a dwelling (ECOA Valuations Rule). One factsheet addressed the transactions that are covered by the rule, and the other factsheet addressed the rule’s delivery and timing requirements.

We noted that the first factsheet was likely to create confusion regarding the ECOA Valuations Rule’s coverage. Without announcement, the CFPB issued a revised version of the factsheet. The revised factsheet does not reflect that there is a prior version of the factsheet.

For the ECOA Valuations Rule to apply, there must be an application for credit to be secured by a dwelling. For purposes of the ECOA Valuations Rule, a “dwelling” is defined as “a residential structure that contains one to four units whether or not that structure is attached to real property. The term includes, but is not limited to, an individual condominium or cooperative unit, and a mobile or other manufactured home.”

The original factsheet and revised factsheet both provide that two factors determine whether a structure is a dwelling under the ECOA Valuations Rule: “The structure: (1) must be residential and (2) contain one-to-four units. When both factors are present, a dwelling exists.” Unfortunately, the first factsheet then provided the following examples of what are and are not dwellings:

Examples of structures that are dwellings:

  • A 10-unit residential structure with three units securing a loan.
  • A parcel of land with multiple residential structures totaling 20 units but with two-units in the same structure securing the loan.
  • A 30-unit condominium with two condos securing a loan.

Examples of structures that are not dwellings include:

  • Multiple dwellings, such as an inventory of individual housing structures, pledged as collateral.
  • A building with more than four residential units securing a loan. For example, a 10-unit residential structure with eight units securing the loan.
  • Land without any type of structure on it.
  • Motor vehicles as defined in 12 USC § 5519(f)(1), including recreational vehicle trailers, motor homes, campers, and recreational boats.
  • A three-unit commercial property.

Despite first indicating that the structure must contain one-to-four units to be a dwelling, the original factsheet then provided examples based on the number of units that secure the loan and not the number of units in the structure.

The revised factsheet sets forth the following examples of what are dwellings for purposes of the ECOA Valuations Rule:

Examples of structures that are dwellings:

  • A parcel of land with multiple residential structures totaling 20 units but with two-units in the same structure securing the loan.
  • A 4-unit condominium with two condos securing a loan.

The CFPB deleted the 10-unit residential structure example, and changed the 30-unit residential structure example to a 4-unit structure example.

With the examples of structures that are not dwellings, the CFPB revised the first example to read:

  • Multiple structures, such as an inventory of individual housing structures, pledged as collateral.

In the first example, the CFPB replaced the word “dwellings” with the word “structures”.

What the CFPB still has not done in the revised factsheet is expressly address whether it interprets the ECOA Valuations Rule to apply when a loan is secured by a first lien on no more than four units in a residential structure that contains more than four units. As a result, the revised factsheet continues to create possible confusion as to the ECOA Valuation Rule’s coverage. If the CFPB interprets the rule to apply where a residential structure contains more than four units, it should amend the rule to provide clarity on that point and apply this interpretation only from the date that the amended rule is effective.

Comment period extension.  Yesterday, the CFPB announced a second 60-day extension of the comment period for its supplemental proposal that would require debt collectors to make specified disclosures when collecting time-barred debts.  The CFPB previously extended the initial May 4 comment deadline until June 5.  The new comment deadline is August 4, 2020.  The CFPB indicated that the latest extension is intended to provide all interested parties with additional time to comment on the rulemaking as a result of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In her opening message that was part of the CFPB’s annual FDCPA report issued in March 2020, Director Kraninger indicated that the Bureau intended to finalize its May 2019 debt collection proposal in 2020.  It is unclear, however, whether the Bureau plans to finalize the May 2019 proposal separately from finalizing its supplemental proposal.  The comment period on the May 2019 proposal closed in August 2019.  If the Bureau is planning to finalize the two proposals at the same time and issue one final rule, the latest extension of the comment period for the supplemental proposal is likely to further delay finalization of the May 2019 proposal.

State emergency SOL actions.  Over the past eight weeks, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, approximately 30 states have taken emergency actions tolling, suspending, extending, or otherwise affecting statutes of limitations, including those that apply to debt collection.  These actions come from a variety of sources—including state courts, governors, and legislatures, making them difficult to identify and track—and they vary widely in scope, timing, and effect.  We have surveyed the available resources on these developments, and do not believe that a complete compilation of these actions is currently available.

State laws and the CFPB’s supplemental proposal that impose restrictions, disclosure requirements, and other obligations based on whether collection of the debt is barred by a statute of limitations have increased the importance of correctly determining whether or not a debt is time-barred.  Ballard Spahr’s Consumer Financial Services Group is considering creating a nationwide survey of these emergency actions so that consumer lenders, debt collectors, and other stakeholders can have timely, accurate, and thorough knowledge to inform their evaluation of risks and options.  We anticipate offering this survey at a fixed fee and providing a subsequent update as part of the same fee.  For more information, please contact Mindy Harris at harrism@ballardspahr.com.



The CFPB announced that it has entered into a proposed settlement with several of the defendants in the lawsuit it filed in January 2020 in a California federal district court that alleges the defendants obtained consumer reports unlawfully, charged unlawful advance fees, and engaged in deceptive conduct.

The defendants included Chou Team Realty, LLC, which does business as Monster Loans (Monster Loans), and Thomas Chou and Sean Cowell (the “Settling Defendants”).  The individual Settling Defendants both allegedly exercised substantial managerial responsibility for and control over Monster Loans’ business practices at the time of the alleged violations.  In its complaint, the Bureau alleges that Monster Loans and a sham company, obtained consumer reports in the form of prescreened lists on the pretense that they planned to use the reports to offer mortgage loans to consumers when, in fact, they provided the reports to other defendant companies not participating in the settlement that used the reports to market student loan debt relief services.

The Bureau claims that  (1) the Settling Defendants violated the FCRA by using or obtaining consumer reports without a permissible purpose to market student loan debt relief services, (2) Monster Loans substantially assisted the non-settling debt relief defendant companies in violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) and the Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), and (3) the individual Settling Defendants invested in the non-settling debt relief defendant companies and received profits from such companies.  (The basis for the Bureau’s TSR and CFPA claims included allegations that the debt relief defendant companies misrepresented their services and unlawfully collected advance fees for debt relief services.)

The proposed stipulated judgment includes the following monetary provisions:

  • An $18 million judgment is entered against Monster Loans for the purpose of providing consumer redress to consumers charged fees by the debt relief defendant companies.
  • Of this judgment, Settling Defendant Chou is jointly and severally liable for $403,750 and Settling Defendant Cowell is jointly and severally liable for $406,150.
  • Upon payment of $200,000 by Monster Loans and $403,750 by Chou, the remainder of the judgment is suspended.
  • Monster Loans must pay a $1 civil money penalty, Chou must pay a $350,000 penalty, and Cowell must pay a $100,000 penalty.  (The $1 penalty is based on Monster Loans’ “limited ability to pay as attested in its financial statements.”)

The proposed settlement also provides that the Settling Defendants are permanently banned from (1) using or obtaining  prescreened consumer reports for any purpose, (2) using or obtaining consumer reports for any business purposes other than underwriting or otherwise evaluating mortgage loans, and (3) offering or providing debt relief services or assisting others, or receiving any remuneration or other consideration from, the offering or providing of such services.

The Bureau’s press release about the proposed settlement indicates that its claims against the other defendants remain pending in the court.



We previously blogged about Virginia’s enactment last month of a law requiring student loan servicers to be licensed by the Virginia State Corporation Commission (“Commission”). As promised, we are providing a more detailed summary of HB 10/SB 77, which is undoubtedly one of the most sweeping laws we’ve seem to date targeted at regulating student loan servicer conduct.

Activity Triggering Licensure

The law’s central feature is a licensing requirement applicable to “qualified education loan servicers.” That term is broadly defined, and covers (subject to exemptions) any person that:

  1. Receives any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower (or notification of such payments) or applies payments to the borrower’s account pursuant to the terms of a qualified education loan (“loan”) or the contract governing the servicing;
  2. Maintains account records for a student loan and communicates with the borrower regarding the loan, on behalf of the loan’s holder, during a period when no payment is required;
  3. Interacts with a borrower, which includes conducting activities to help prevent default on obligations arising from loans or to facilitate the receipt and/or application of payments to a borrower’s account.

The Commission can begin accepting license applications on or before March 1, 2021, and licensing will be via the NMLS.

Exemptions and Automatic Licensing Process

Certain financial institutions, as well as public or nonprofit institutions of higher education, are not only exempt from licensure, but fully-excluded from the law’s coverage. Specifically, the statute does not apply to any “bank, savings institution, credit union, or financial institution subject to regulation under 12 U.S.C. § 2002 [Farm Credit System].” A wholly-owned subsidiary of one of these institutions is also exempt, provided the subsidiary is subject to regulation, audit, or examination by a state or federal regulatory agency.

Servicers of federal loans and guarantors are not exempt, but the law calls for the creation of an automatic licensing process under which such servicers could obtain a license from the Commission after verifying eligibility. Notably, entities licensed under this process are subject to the law’s recordkeeping requirements, “except to the extent that the requirements are inconsistent with federal law,” and the law provides that nothing in the section addressing the automatic licensing process “prevents the Commission from issuing an order to temporarily or permanently prohibit or bar any person from acting as a qualified education loan servicer or violating applicable law.” So, the legislation gives a nod to the preemption concerns regarding federal student loan servicing, but still asserts sweeping authority to regulate servicer conduct.

Prohibited Activities and Required Affirmative Acts

The statute sets forth extensive lists of prohibited activities and affirmative requirements applicable to loan servicers.

Among the prohibitions set forth in the law, a covered servicer may not do any of the following:

  • Directly or indirectly employ any scheme, device, or artifice to defraud or mislead borrowers;
  • Engage in any unfair or deceptive act or practice toward any person or misrepresent or omit any material information in connection with the servicing of a loan, including misrepresenting (i) the amount, nature, or terms of any fee or payment due or claimed to be due on a loan; (ii) the terms and conditions of the loan agreement; or (iii) the borrower’s obligations under the loan;
  • Obtain property by fraud or misrepresentation;
  • Misapply loan payments to the outstanding balance of a loan;
  • Provide inaccurate information to a nationally recognized consumer credit bureau;
  • Fail to report both the favorable and unfavorable payment history of the borrower to a nationally recognized consumer credit bureau at least annually if the loan servicer regularly reports information to such a credit bureau;
  • Fail to communicate with an authorized representative of the borrower who provides a written authorization signed by the borrower, provided that the loan servicer may adopt procedures reasonably related to verifying that the representative is in fact authorized to act on behalf of the borrower;
  • Make any false statement of a material fact or omit any material fact in connection with any information provided to the Commission or another governmental authority; or
  • Engage in abusive acts or practices when servicing a loan as defined under the statute.

The law also requires that a qualified education loan servicer “comply with all federal laws and regulations applicable to the conduct of its licensed business,” and makes any failure to do so a violation of the statute. Additionally, the Commissioner may also promulgate regulations prohibiting activities not expressly set forth in the statute.

In terms of affirmative requirements, servicers are required to do each of the following except to the extent Virginia’s requirements are “inconsistent with any provision of federal law or regulation, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency”:

  • Evaluate a borrower for eligibility, if applicable, for an income-driven repayment program prior to placing the borrower in forbearance or default;
  • Respond to a written inquiry from a borrower or the representative of a borrower within specified timeframes;
  • Not furnish to a consumer reporting agency, during 60 days following receipt of a written request related to a dispute on a borrower’s payment, information regarding a payment that is the subject of the written request;
  • Inquire of a borrower how to apply an overpayment to a loan (except as provided in federal law or required by a loan agreement);
  • Apply partial payments in a manner that minimizes late fees and negative credit reporting;
  • Require, as a condition of a sale, an assignment, or any other transfer of servicing, that the new loan servicer honor all benefits originally represented as available to a borrower during the repayment of the loan and preserve the availability of the benefits, including any benefits for which the borrower has not yet qualified; and
  • In the event of a sale, assignment, or other transfer of servicing that results in a change in the identity of the person to whom a borrower is required to send payments or direct any communication concerning the loan, transfer all records, notify affected borrowers, and adopt policies and procedures to verify that the new servicer has received all records regarding the borrower’s account.


The Commission has a number of remedies available to it to address violations of the statute, including suspending or revoking a license, issuing cease and desist orders, and imposing civil penalties (in the amount of $2,500 per violation).

One of the most salient and concerning aspects of this law is the creation of a private right of action available to “[a]ny person who suffers damage as a result of the failure of a qualified education loan servicer to comply” with this law or with applicable federal student loan servicing laws and regulations. Relief may include actual damages, injunctive relief, restitution, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, or any “other relief the court deems proper.” However, as an additional remedy, treble damages are available if “a qualified education loan servicer has engaged in conduct that substantially interferes with a borrower’s right to (i) an alternative payment arrangement; (ii) loan forgiveness, cancellation, or discharge; or (iii) any other financial benefit as established under the terms of a borrower’s promissory note or under the Higher Education Act” subject to a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

The Texas federal district court hearing the lawsuit filed by two trade groups challenging the CFPB’s final payday/auto title/high-rate installment loan rule (Payday Rule) entered an order yesterday that once again continues the stay of the lawsuit and the August 19, 2019 compliance date for both the Payday Rule’s ability-to-repay (ATR) provisions and its payment provisions.

Although the Bureau’s final rule delaying the compliance date for the ATR provisions left unchanged the August 19, 2019 compliance date for the Payday Rule’s payment provisions, the stay of the compliance date entered by the court on November 6, 2018 stayed the compliance date for both the ATR and the payment provisions.

Yesterday’s order follows the filing of the most recent status report on April 24 by the CFPB and trade groups.  It includes the following statement:

The parties’ report informs the court that the Bureau continues to make progress on its other rulemaking, which
proposed to rescind the underwriting provisions.  The Bureau has stated in the Fall 2019 Unified Agenda of
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions that it expects to take final action on the underwriting provisions in April 2020,
and that the parties will inform the court of further developments.  It is now May 2020, and the parties have yet to
inform the court about whether any action set by the Fall 2019 agenda has occurred regarding the underwriting proposals.  Finally, none of the parties request the court lift the stay of litigation or the stay of the compliance date at this time.

Yesterday’s order directs the parties to file another joint status report by September 11 “informing the court about proceedings related to the Rule and this litigation as the parties deem appropriate.”


The CFPB has issued a statement regarding its supervisory and enforcement approach to Regulation Z billing error resolution timeframes in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the statement, the Bureau acknowledges that some creditors and entities such as merchants, particularly those that are small businesses, may be facing significant operational disruptions as a result of the pandemic.  For example, such disruptions may make it difficult for merchants to provide information to creditors in connection with investigations of consumers’ billing error notices.  In turn, as the Bureau observes, this makes it more difficult for creditors to accurately and timely resolve such notices.  The Bureau also observes that if creditors were to make decisions on such notices without access to merchants’ information, merchants could be damaged by owing chargebacks for transactions that might otherwise not have been deemed errors and consumers might be damaged by incorrect decisions based on insufficient information.

Due to these considerations, the Bureau indicates in the statement that in evaluating a creditor’s compliance with Regulation Z’s maximum timeframe for billing error resolution, the Bureau intends to consider the creditor’s circumstances and does not intend to cite a violation in an examination or bring an enforcement action against a creditor that exceeds that timeframe so long as the creditor “has made good faith efforts to obtain the necessary information and make a determination as quickly as possible, and complies with all other requirements pending resolution of the error.”  As an example of good faith efforts, the Bureau indicates that a creditor may show that it obtained a reasonable estimate from the merchant of when it will be able to respond or reasonably determined that the merchant “is unable to respond to the creditor’s request for information for the time being.”  The Bureau also encourages creditors to show flexibility to consumers when deciding whether to apply the Regulation Z 60-day timeline for providing a billing error notice after the error appears on the first periodic statement.

At the same time, the Bureau indicates that it does not expect the pandemic to prevent any creditor from fully complying with the Regulation Z requirements in Section 1026.13(d).  Until a creditor resolves a billing error in compliance with the Regulation Z procedures, the creditor is subject to the following requirements in Section 1026.13(d):

  • The consumer need not pay, and the creditor may not attempt to collect, any portion of any required payment that the consumer believes is related to the disputed amount, including related finance or other charges.
  • The creditor or its agent may not, directly or indirectly, make or threaten to make an adverse report about the consumer’s credit standing or report that an amount or account is delinquent because the consumer failed to pay the disputed amount or related finance or other charges.
  • The creditor may not accelerate any part of the consumer’s indebtedness or restrict or close a consumer’s account solely because the consumer has exercised in good faith his or her billing error dispute rights.

It should be noted that despite the supervisory or enforcement relief offered by the CFPB, creditors could still face consumer litigation alleging Regulation Z violations where the creditor has exceeded the error resolution timeframes.

The CFPB issued two sets of FAQs that discuss assistance that financial services providers can offer consumers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

One set of FAQs is directed at providers of checking, savings, or prepaid accounts.  The FAQs deal with an account provider’s ability to change account terms and the ways account providers can provide immediate relief to consumers.  In its responses, the CFPB reminds providers that they can offer consumers immediate relief by changing account terms without advance notice under Regulations E or DD where the change in terms is clearly favorable to the consumer.  The Bureau includes as examples that a provider can eliminate ATM fees or that pursuant to the Federal Reserve Board’s April 2020 interim final rule deleting the six-per-month transfer limit on savings accounts, a provider can eliminate transfer fees on savings accounts without providing advance notice.  It also notes that providers can use their discretion (as long as not done in a discriminatory manner) to waive or reduce fees on a case-by-case basis.  The Bureau suggests that as a way of avoiding telephone queues, providers consider implementing waivers on their own initiative rather than wait for the consumer to contact the provider.  It comments that this approach could facilitate consumer access to economic impact payments (under the CARES Act).

The other set of FAQs is directed at creditors offering open-end credit (that is not home-secured).  Two of the FAQs similarly deal with a creditor’s ability to change account terms. In its responses, the CFPB reminds creditors that they can offer consumers immediate relief without advance notice under Regulation Z by reducing any charges or making an APR reduction as part of a temporary hardship arrangement.  It also discusses how a creditor can take advantage of the flexibility Regulation Z provides to avoid giving advance written notice of the terms of a hardship arrangement and the terms that will apply at the end of the arrangement where the arrangement is entered into by telephone.  The Bureau comments that while not required, creditors can remind consumers when a forbearance period is nearing its end as a way of reducing consumer confusion and complaints.

A third FAQ addresses how creditors can engage with consumers to assist them during the pandemic.  The Bureau suggests that creditors consider highlighting to consumers how they can use online resources or email to communicate with the creditor, adding additional communications or materials when sending periodic statements, and making consumers aware of the Bureau’s resources for consumers.  The Bureau also discusses electronic delivery of required disclosures and obtaining consumer consent to electronic provision of disclosures.



PayPal has filed a motion for summary judgment in its lawsuit against the CFPB seeking to invalidate the Bureau’s prepaid card rule (“Rule”).  The Rule became effective on April 1, 2019.  The relief sought by PayPal in the lawsuit, which was filed in December 2019 in the D.C. federal district court, includes vacating the Rule and enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the Rule.

PayPal’s primary consumer offering is a “digital wallet.”  A digital wallet is primarily used by a consumer to access his or her traditional payment devices (Funding Instruments), such as credit cards, debit cards, and checking accounts in order to allow the consumer to make electronic peer-to-peer transfers of funds or to purchase products from third-party merchants. To use a digital wallet, a consumer links the wallet to the credentials for the Funding Instruments.  Once linked, PayPal can complete a transaction on the consumer’s behalf.  Significantly, when completing a transaction involving a consumer’s use of the wallet to make a purchase from a merchant, only PayPal accesses the payment credentials for the Funding Instrument selected by the consumer to pay for the purchase.  As a result, the consumer does not have to expose his or her full financial credentials to the merchant.

PayPal’s complaint takes aim at the Bureau’s decision when adopting the Rule to impose the same regulatory regime on digital wallets as it imposed on “prepaid cards” or “general purpose reloadable cards” (GPR cards) despite the material differences that exist between the products.  Specifically, PayPal targets the Rule’s mandated short form disclosure and its 30-day ban on linking credit products to prepaid accounts.

PayPal’s summary judgment motion tracks the claims made in its complaint.  Its principal arguments are:

  • The Bureau exceeded its EFTA statutory authority by mandating that digital wallet providers use the fee disclosure form designed for GPR cards.  The EFTA directs the Bureau to issue “model clauses for optional use by financial institutions.” The EFTA does not allow the Bureau to require the use of a particular model form.
  • Although the Bureau relied on TILA for its authority to promulgate the 30-day ban, TILA does not give the Bureau general authority to restrict consumers’ acquisition or use of credit.  TILA is a disclosure statute intended to promote the informed use of credit by consumers.  The 30-day ban is a substantive restriction on the use of credit because it restricts digital wallet consumers from linking independently-acquired credit cards to a digital wallet.
  • In subjecting digital wallets to a regulatory scheme designed for GPR cards, the Bureau made a fundamental category error that was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  The Bureau capriciously ignored key differences between GPR cards and digital wallets by using a one-size-fits-all approach and subjected digital wallets to heightened regulation based on unfounded speculation about consumer risks arising from digital wallets.
  • The Bureau failed to perform a cost-benefit analysis with respect to digital wallets as required by the APA, the EFTA, and the Dodd-Frank Act.
  • By requiring PayPal to make misleading and inapplicable disclosures to its customers while prohibiting it from offering relevant clarifying information, the Rule is a content-based restriction on PayPal’s free speech rights.  The Rule violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it does not satisfy either a strict scrutiny or a reasonably-related standard for scrutinizing such restrictions.


The CFPB has issued a final rule amending its remittance rule.  The final rule is effective July 21, 2020.

The key amendments consist of the following:

  • Safe harbor threshold.  Currently, the rule’s safe harbor threshold removes from the rule’s coverage an entity that provided 100 or fewer remittance transfers in the previous calendar year and provides 100 or fewer remittance transfers in the current calendar year.  The final rule increases the safe harbor threshold from 100 transfers to 500 transfers annually.
  • Use of estimates.  To mitigate the effects of the July 21, 2020 expiration of the statutory exception that allows insured institutions, under certain conditions, to disclose estimates to consumers of the exchange rate and covered third-party fees instead of exact amounts, the final rule creates two new, permanent exceptions:
    • Insured institutions are permitted to estimate the exchange rate for transfers to a particular country if, among other things, the insured institution made 1,000 or fewer transfers in the prior calendar year to the particular country for which the designated recipients of such transfers received funds in that country’s local currency.
    • Insured institutions are permitted to estimate third-party fees for a transfer to a particular designated recipient’s institution if, among other things, the insured institution made 500 or fewer transfers to the designated recipient’s institution in the prior calendar year.

The final rule includes a transition period for insured institutions that exceed, as applicable, the 1,000 transfer or 500 transfer thresholds in a certain year.  During the transition period, an institution can continue to provide estimates for a reasonable period of time after crossing such thresholds while coming into compliance with the requirement to provide exact amounts.

In connection with its proposed amendments, the Bureau sought comment on the rule’s permanent exception that allows providers to use estimates for transfers to certain countries as determined by the Bureau.  The Bureau has currently identified five countries that qualify for this exception.  Among other issues, the Bureau asked for suggestions regarding possible changes to the substantive criteria used to determine whether a country qualifies for the list and the process the Bureau uses for adding countries to the list.  In the Supplementary Information accompanying the final rule, the Bureau states that it is not amending this exception or the countries list as part of the final rule but will update the process it uses to consider requests to add or remove countries from its countries list.  In addition, the Bureau indicates that it will make decisions on pending requests to add two countries to the list.

Also in the Supplementary Information, the Bureau references the policy statement it issued last month regarding its approach to supervision and enforcement of remittance transfers during the COVID-19 pandemic.  The policy statement is intended to mitigate the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic creates for institutions that will no longer be able to provide estimates of the exchange rate and covered third-party fees when the temporary exception expires on July 21, 2020.  In the policy statement, the CFPB advises that for remittance transfers that occur on or after July 21, 2020 and before January 1, 2021, it does not intend to cite in an examination or initiate an enforcement action “in connection with the disclosure of actual third-party fees and exchange rates against any insured institution that will be newly required to disclose actual costs after the temporary exception expires, and instead continues to provide estimated disclosures that would have been allowed under the temporary exception.”