The Supreme Court’s June 29, 2026 decisions in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook raise fundamental questions about presidential power, the independence of federal agencies, and the constitutional structure of the administrative state. Although both cases involved the President’s authority to remove federal officials, the Court’s decisions appear to point in different directions. In our latest Consumer Finance Monitor podcast, our host, Alan Kaplinsky (founder and former practice group leader for 25 years and now Senior Counsel of our Consumer Financial Financial Services Group) discuss these decisions and their potentially far-reaching implications with Professor Lev Menand of Columbia Law School, one of the country’s leading scholars on administrative law, constitutional structure, financial regulation, and the Federal Reserve System.

In Trump v. Slaughter, the Court, in a 6–3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Federal Trade Commission Act’s restrictions on the President’s ability to remove FTC commissioners violate the separation of powers. The Court concluded that FTC commissioners exercise substantial executive authority and therefore must remain accountable to the President through his removal power. In reaching that conclusion, the Court expressly overruled its 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which had upheld restrictions on the President’s removal of FTC commissioners.

The decision represents a major development in the Court’s embrace of the unitary executive theory and could have significant consequences for the structure and independence of federal agencies. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson, dissented, arguing that the majority had discarded nearly a century of precedent and fundamentally altered the structure of independent agencies. Justice Neil Gorsuch, while concurring in the judgment, raised an additional constitutional concern: whether Congress has delegated excessive legislative authority to administrative agencies.

In Trump v. Cook, decided the same day, the Court took a different approach to the attempted removal of Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. In a 5–4 decision, the Court left in place an injunction preventing her removal while litigation continues. Although the Court did not resolve the ultimate merits of the dispute, it suggested that the Federal Reserve may occupy a unique constitutional position, drawing on historical references to the First and Second Banks of the United States.

In our discussion, Professor Menand questions the historical analogy between those early banks and the modern Federal Reserve Board, emphasizing the distinction between a bank (which is what the First and Second Banks of the United States were) and a government agency that regulates banks (which is a significant part of what the Federal Reserve Board does.) We explore whether Cook establishes a meaningful exception to Slaughter, how far that exception might extend, and whether other financial regulators, including the FDIC, might be able to invoke similar arguments to preserve their independence.

Our conversation also examines several other important issues:

• The future of independent agencies. Which agencies are most vulnerable to challenges following Slaughter, and what does the decision mean for the National Labor Relations Board, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and other federal regulators?
• The Federal Reserve’s constitutional status. Does Cook actually resolve the question of whether Congress may restrict the President’s authority to remove Federal Reserve governors, or does that issue remain open? We also discuss whether the Court’s reasoning in the two cases is consistent and what it means for the Fed’s regulatory and monetary policy functions.
• Justice Gorsuch’s nondelegation concerns. Could Slaughter be a precursor to a renewed effort to limit Congress’s ability to delegate authority to federal agencies? We discuss the potential implications for the FTC Act’s prohibitions on unfair or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition, as well as the distinction between the nondelegation doctrine and the major questions doctrine. We previously published on July 6, 2026 a blog about the potential implications of Justice Gorsuch’s non-delegation concerns.
• Potential responses by Congress and the courts. Could Congress restructure independent agencies or otherwise preserve their independence within the constitutional framework established by Slaughter? We also consider whether the Supreme Court itself might eventually narrow the decision, as the Court did with its earlier presidential removal decision in Myers v. United States.
• What lies ahead for financial services regulation. We consider the implications of these decisions for the federal agencies that regulate banks and other providers of consumer financial services, including the possible impact on the FDIC and other independent financial regulators.

Professor Menand views Slaughter as one of the most consequential separation-of-powers decisions in American history and questions whether the Court’s reasoning adequately accounts for the longstanding role of independent agencies in the federal regulatory system. He also cautions that the decisions may have consequences extending well beyond presidential removal authority, potentially affecting the ability of the federal government to establish consistent national regulatory standards.

The discussion concludes with Professor Menand’s assessment of where the law may be headed over the next five years and why the long-term consequences of these decisions remain difficult to predict.

Listen to our latest Consumer Finance Monitor podcast for an in-depth discussion of these consequential decisions and their implications for the future of the administrative state and federal financial regulation.

Postscript: Trump Establishes Committee to Reconsider Lisa Cook’s Removal

Since recording this podcast, President Trump has announced a new effort to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. On October 7, Trump established a three-member committee of inquiry to investigate allegations that Cook made false statements in connection with mortgage documents and to recommend whether there is “cause” for her removal under the Federal Reserve Act. The committee consists of Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council; Keith Sonderling, acting director of the Office of Government Ethics; and Andrea Lucas, chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

The committee is scheduled to hold a closed, transcribed hearing at the White House on November 5, at which Cook may respond to the allegations and present evidence and arguments through counsel. It must provide written findings and a recommendation to Trump after receiving any post-hearing submission from Cook, due November 10. The initiative follows the Supreme Court’s June decision leaving in place an injunction against Cook’s removal while litigation proceeds, with the Court emphasizing the need to provide her notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond. Cook’s attorneys have questioned whether the new process will be impartial, pointing to Trump’s repeated statements that he has already decided to fire her. The committee’s proceedings could therefore provide an important test of the procedural requirements governing a President’s authority to remove a Federal Reserve governor for cause.